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Considering the sizable volume of secondary litera-
ture on the Gadamer-Habermas debate that has accumu-
lated over the past decade, it may appear to many that 
little can be added to it in the way of illuminating 
commentary that has not already been said. This opin-
ion, nevertheless, is disputed by the persistance of 
the debate itself, which v/as vigorously renewed in a 
Canadian symposium (1979).1 Moreover, it would appear 
from perusing Habermas' recent tome, Theorie des kommu-
nikativen Handelns (1981), that the issues debated in 
the controversy at least continue to be of vital in-
terest to him. My intention, however, is not to delve 
into these new materials in order to produce yet 
another commentary. Nor shall I undertake a survey of 
the secondary literature with the aim of assessing the 
controversy itself. I propose instead to trace the 
controversy back to its historical roots in a series of 
philosophical and sociological debates that throw into 
relief the neo-Kantian and, above all, the neo-Hegelian 
motifs that reoccur in the philosophies of the two 
principals. 
The earliest commentaries on the controversy gen-
erally underscore the differences between Habermas and 
Gadamer. Ricoeur's essay, "Ethics and Culture" (1973) 
is typical in this regard.* Though emphasizing the 
complementarity of Habermas' and Gadamer's views, he 
was mostly concerned to portray the former as defending 
a distanciating, explanatory social methodology and the 
latter as defending a participatory, hermeneutic one. 
Along with August Wellmer, Ricceur saw the debate as 
principally a methodological dispute emanating from an-
tithetical attitudes toward tradition and authority. 
According to Wellmer, Gadamer's hermeneutics seeks to 
rehabilitate tradition, prejudice and authority in a 
way that reacts against the critical, emancipatory 
legacy of the Enlightenment appropriated by Habermas in 
his proposal for a scientifically grounded ideology 
critique.1 Subtler comparisons of the two disputants 
were proffered by Dieter Misgeld and Theodore Kisiel, 
who attributed their disagreement to a trenchant asym-
metry in levels of discourse.* On Misgeld's reading of 
the controversy, Gadamer's position advances an on-
86 
tological claim about the ineluctable culture-bound 
nature of understanding that precludes the possibility 
of attaining a methodologically detached standpoint. 
Habermas, on the contrary, ostensibly defends the pos-
sibility of achieving a methodologically secured, 
tradition-transcending reflection capable of grounding 
itself in universal reference points. 
The reader attempting to disentangle the often con-
voluted strands of the first rounds of the controversy 
will no doubt recognize as true (if only partially) the 
characterizations of the debate adumbrated above. More 
recent commentaries by McCarthy, Giddens, Bubner, 
Ricoeur, Misgeld, Böhler, Kisiel, Mendelsohn, Gall, 
and How, having had the advantage of being exposed to 
the later, more conciliatory exchanges, generally em-
phasize the similarities at least as much as the 
differences.* 
It is, I believe, of great consequence that most of 
these commentators overlook the relationship between 
this controversy and earlier debates within German 
sociology and philosophy centering around neo-Kantian 
schools of thought. This is indeed surprising given 
the fact that Gadamer and Habermas descend from philo-
sophical traditions steeped in neo-Kantianism—and have 
even reproached one another for it. Mow the theses 
which I propose to defend concern Gadamer's and 
Habermas' respective attempts to break out of this tra-
dition by retrieving aspects of the Hegelian heritage. 
(It is customary to classify Habermas as the Kantian 
and Gadamer as the Hegelian, but I shall argue that one 
can just as easily reverse these classifications.) 
First, I shall argue that both Gadamer and Habermas 
repudiate the narrow methodological and positivistic 
compass of neo-Kantian thought by developing concep-
tions of practical knowledge that rest upon more basic, 
dialectical theories of human understanding. The 
failure of the early commentators to grasp the bila-
teral nature of this rejection could not but mislead 
them into interpreting the controversy as if it were a 
methodological dispute. Second, I intend to show that, 
not surprisingly, Gadamer and Habermas orient their 
hermeneutic programs around opposing traditions of 
Hegelian thought which conceive practical reason in 
radically different ways. Finally, I shall attempt to 
defend the thesis that, despite their common rejection 
of a neo-Kantian fact-value dualism, they nevertheless 
end up by reaffirming it. 
My procedure will be to begin with what I take to 
be the locus of the controversy, namely Gadamer's and 
Habermas' respective views concerning the nature of 
language and society. Rather than cover ground 
hitherto surveyed by others, I shall instead concen-
trate on a few relatively neglected passages from the 
corpus of their writings that testify to their salient 
differences (Sec. I). After laying out the sharpest 
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possible contrast between them I shall undertake to 
show how both philosophers share a common antipathy 
toward cardinal tenets of neo-Kantian thought. This 
lengthy historical digression is really the heart of 
the paper and will be divided into four sections as 
follows. 
The first part (sec. II) attempts to explain how 
the methodological debates among neo-Kantians at the 
turn of the century grew out of earlier epistemological 
disputes dating back to antiquity. The decisive figure 
in this synopsis is Vico, who marks the transition from 
the Renaissance preoccupation with rhetoric and poetry 
to contemporary methodological concerns pertaining to 
the scientific value of historical understanding. The 
second part (Sec. Ill) examines how this latter theme 
became pivito1 for later debates among neo-Kantians. 
The third part (Sec. IV) addresses two decisive 
disputes pitting Gadamer and Habermas against represen-
tatives of neo-Kantian schools of thought. It is at 
this juncture of our historical survey that the affini-
ties between Gadamer and Habermas are most evident. 
The fourth part (Sec. V) analyzes the Hegelian legacy 
which forms the backbone of their philosophical 
programs. The conclusion of the essay (Sec. VI) con-
tains some of my own thoughts about the possibility of 
reconciling Gadamer and Habermas as well as a critical 
assessment of their attempts to disburden themselves of 
their neo-Kantian heritage. 
I 
The cornerstone of Gadamer'8 theory of society is a 
claim about the universality of language as a medium of 
dialogue. "Language is by itself the game of inter-
pretation that we are all engaged in everyday. In this 
game nobody is above and before all others; everybody 
is at the center, is 'it' in this game. Thus it is al-
ways his turn to be interpreting."8 The game 
metaphor—Gadamer's favorite—is invoked by him to il-
lustrate the primacy of social process over individual 
agency. Although the individual counts as one voice in 
the body politic to which the established traditions 
and institutions must appeal for their own legitimacy, 
his behavior and power is nonetheless limited by the 
collective life which binds him to their authority. 
The resistance of language and tradition to subjective 
manipulation is directly related to Heidegger's on-
tological analysis of understanding. Finite Dasein is 
implicated in a linguistic event over which it has no 
absolute control. Drawing an analogy between biologi-
cal and social organism, Gadamer suggests that language 
is an equilibrium of stratified forces which bears the 
indelible imprint of its past (qua tradition that has 
been handed down) and its present, including the infin-
ite richness of meaning and expression associated with 
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a diversified political culture. The diffuseness of 
communication in Gadamer's organic model of society en-
tails, first, that language is impervious to the kind 
of hegemonic class domination implicit in a Marxian 
theory of ideology, and second, that it is a game of 
near equals and therefore approximately instantiates 
the sort of reciprocity constitutive of true dialogue. 
In connection with this general point, Gadamer goes so 
far as to suggest that even the mass-media technocrat 
is "educated" by the humble consumer who expresses his 
power through the scale of preferences he brings to 
bear in the marketplace.7 
In one of his most significant essays, Gadamer 
warns that external intervention on the part of the 
social scientist in the life of the community, either 
in the form of social engineering or social therapy, 
runs the same risk of upsetting the delicate balance of 
stratified social forces, which gravitate toward a pri-
mary ethical consensus, as do the physicians medical 
interventions with respect to the physiological homeo-
stasis of the biological organism. "Therapy intervenes 
externally into a system that is already internally 
balanced and self-regulating. Each intervention 
(Eingriff) which gives rise to a disturbance in this 
state of equilibrium (Gleichgewicht) runs the danger of 
unintentionally altering other conditions of equili-
brium . . .we are (here) not concerned with the knowledge 
of the specialist, who, as the wise man proceeds over 
and against others [den anderen gegenüber tritt), but 
rather with a type of knowledge that, however indispen-
sable it may be, cannot be provided by science [and] 
which alone has its solitary basis in the solidarity 
that unites everyone."* The idea that society, like 
biological organism, has a range of variation deter-
mined by its state of equilibrium entails that ideology 
critique cannot transgress those boundaries which give 
society continuity without threatening its collective 
moral identity. 
Gadamer concludes that any attempt to evaluate 
society on the basis of abstract, transcendental 
criteria that are external to tradition-bound under-
standing inevitably succumbs to Utopian extremism and 
he cites as a case in point Habermas!an psychotherapeu-
tic sociology, which violates conditions of mutual 
recognition underlying the possibility of communication 
in general when it arrogates to itself the special 
privilege of treating others as pathologically af-
fected, and, therefore, as lacking the qualifications 
for full dialogical partnership.* 
Gadamer contends that because de facto traditional 
authority, including the authority which accrues to the 
politician, educator, and anyone else who masters the 
art of producing conviction in others through rhetoric, 
is a necessary condition for the possibility of gener-
ating dialogical consensus, it is ceteris paribus, 
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rational. Consistent with this amalgamation of rhe-
torical humanism and ontological hermeneutics is 
Gadamer*s notion of practical truth. The shared norms 
governing conduct are neither demonstrable nor univo-
cal, but reflect a plurality of goals and obligations, 
constantly subject to new and differing interpreta-
tions, that emerge naturally in the continuous exchange 
of opinions and the play of forces representing past 
and present traditions. One can perceive in Gadamer*s 
appeal to rhetorical humanism, which invests ordinary 
self-understanding and everyday discourse with the dig-
nity of common sense, a democratic tendency which miti-
gates the authoritarian aspects of his ontological 
hermeneutics. According to Gadamer, philosophical her-
meneutics must demonstrate the inherent rationality of 
that understanding and the tradition which grounds it 
by revealing the deep linguisticality uniting all 
realms of experience and knowledge. 
Habermas' attempt to redeem a concept of practical 
truth takes its bearings from a contrary set of 
assumptions. Habermas argues that social action ex-
hibits an aetiological profile that is isomorphic to 
that of neurotically inhibited behavior. Though 
cultural norms are accepted as legitimate by social 
agents, they are done so out of ideological compul-
sions. The repression of authentic emancipatory needs 
along with the concomitant substitution of publically 
sanctioned modes of gratification remains incomplete, 
however, for the former invariably surface in the 
familiar symptoms of identity crisis--alienation, 
anomie, and anarchy. Repression is itself a function 
of subtle economic and political coercion and consti-
tutes an abrogation of dialogical reciprocity. To con-
strue dialogical reciprocity as an ontological condi-
tion in the way that Gadamer does "promotes the fiction 
that Socratic dialogue is possible everywhere and at 
any time." 1 8 Given the ubiquitous impact of mass media 
on our everyday lives, vernacular language and quotid-
ian patterns of speech and thought invariably succumb 
to the distorting influences of the market. The latter 
is less a dialogue among equals than it is a rhetorical 
and strategical manipulation of public opinion by cor-
porate powers and established political elites. 
Given the irrationality of actual political dis-
course, the function of philosophy can only be the ad-
vancement of prospective social change through critical 
enlightenment. Radical critique presupposes a theoret-
ical standpoint that is at least partially removed from 
actual political discourse. Herein lies Habermas' 
deviation from classical humanist thought. Theoretical 
distanciation is reflected both in Critical Theory's 
return to transcendental ethics and in its incorpora-
tion of the objectifying methods of exact science. 
Philosophical reflection is not only said to possess 
the capacity to discover universal criteria of ration-
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ality which warrant the questioning of de facto social 
consensus but it is also provided with a method--that 
of psychotherapy—which ostensibly fosters such 
conduct. Habermas hau been especially concerned to 
show that the criteria of rationality are embedded in 
the necessary presuppositions for communicative, or 
consensual, uses of language that ground normative 
social solidarity. Insofar as persons are held ration-
ally accountable for their actions, they must be im-
puted to possess the competency to justify their ac-
tions in rational discourse. The defining feature of 
rational persuasion in turn can only be captured in 
terms of the counter-factual pragmatic conditions un-
derlying an "ideal speech situation" which entail per-
fect reciprocity, a complete suspension of unilateral 
economic and political privleges, and freedom from the 
internal constraints of dogmatic tradition.11 
II 
The methodological disputes among neo-Kantians that 
form the backdrop to the Gadamer-Habermas controversy 
have their genesis in the conflict, as Lord Snow so ap-
tly put it. between "two cultures."1* Today this con-
flict chiefly revolves around the role of scientific 
method with respect to the research procedures and 
epistemological criteria of the humanities and social 
sciences. What is at stake in the conflict is nothing 
less than the epistemological credibility of these 
sciences. Can they be improved by adopting the methods 
of the exact sciences, or do they provide a form of 
practical knowledge that resists such regimentation? 
If they do provide practical knowledge, then how is 
such knowledge possible? 
The above conflict has a long geneology which dates 
back to ancient Greece. Although Plato did not dif-
ferentiate kinds of knowledge so much as designate a 
hierarchy of epistemic levels, he did elevate the ab-
stract, ratiocinative understanding of philosophy and 
mathematics (episteroe) above the concrete, perceptually 
oriented experience of common sense (doxa). Departing 
from this premise he quite naturally saw ordinary lan-
guage and tradition as confused amalgams of partial 
truths (doxa) that were easily susceptible to the 
machinations of sophism. This view ran counter to the 
classical model of education advanced by the Isocratic 
school of philosophy, wnich stressed the importance of 
rhetoric and poetry for achieving civic virtue. 
Recalling Pascal's distinction between 1'esprit de 
finesse and 1'esprit de geometrique, Henri Marrou 
notes in his study of education in antiquity that 
whereas Plato reacted against the unregimented, essen-
tially aesthetic ideal of paideia, which promoted the 
development of human character and moral sensibility 
through cultivation in the literary arts, Isocrates, 
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who was certainly no practitioner of self-serving 
sophistry, embraced the ideal as the highest expression 
of ethical life. For Plato, the demonstrability and 
methodological rigor of geometry were the sine qua non 
of all knowledge, including knowledge of the good. 
Isocrates, on the contrary, inaugurated the humanistic 
tradition that emphasised the importance of emulating 
the authoritative elocutionary styles of past literati 
and artfully and innovatively deploying them in service 
to the community.1* 
We owe the first taxonomic treatment of knowledge 
to Aristotle, who distinguished episteme" (consisting of 
metaphysics, physics, and mathematics), which he 
defined as the contemplation of objects that are immune 
to change of human origin, from both phrone'sis, or 
practical wisdom, and techriS, or productive skill, a 
schema roughly corresponding to the classical distinc-
tion between thforia, praxis, and poiSsis. (Logic was 
not included in the classification of the sciences, but 
was instead treated as a propadeutic organon.) By 
separating these types of discourse, Aristotle suc-
ceeded in charting a middle course between Isocrates 
and Plato. According to Aristotle, phrone'sis is activ-
ity in accordance with the mean (the Greek ideal of 
sophrosyrie, roughly meaning temporate, or judicious 
conduct) which presupposes a kind of grace and artful-
ness in applying standards of excellence. Though such 
standards are capable of discursive, theoretical treat-
ment of the sort found in Aristotle's own work in 
politics and ethics, their general, practical import 
must be qualified relative to particular circumstances. 
Significantly, Aristotle identified tradition, not 
theoria, as the ultimate source of normative enlighten-
ment and he observed that ethical conduct as such is 
more a function of character and habit than of any 
technical mastery of rules and means. 1 4 
Aristotle's classification of knowledge was appro-
priated by the Stoics in their simplified triad of 
logic, physics, and ethics, and this schema was 
retained mutatis mutandis by medieval scholasticism and 
its division of the seven liberal arts into the trivium 
(grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric) and the quadrivium 
(arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music), followed 
by the more advanced ethical studies in theology, law, 
and medicine. The scholastics' desire to reconcile 
reason and faith invariably led them to place an inor-
dinate weight upon dialectic (syllogistic logic) with 
its overly prolix, abstruse style of Latin, thereby 
leaving the cultivation of vernacular grammar and rhe-
toric in a state of disuetude. The Quattrocento 
Renaissance humanists such as Leonardo Bruni, Leon 
Albert!, and Vittorina da Feltre rebelled against the 
arid metaphysical speculation of the scholastics and 
sought to infuse the university curriculum with a re-
newed interest in classical studies." Their ideal was 
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not so much the contemplative humanism of Petrarch, but 
the civic humanism espoused earlier by Isocrates. 
With the dissolution of the medieval curriculum and 
the concomitant removal of theology from the realm of 
knowledge, the natural sciences also rose to a position 
of prominence. Particularly germane to this develop-
ment was the discovery of the experimental method, 
which was given a far-reaching exposition by Francis 
Bacon. 
The first step of the method as Bacon conceived it 
was the refutation of those impediments to knowledge 
which he entitled the "four idols," the principal ones 
from our perspective being the Idols of the Cave and 
the Idols of the Market Place. Among the former was 
included the natural propensity to esteem the tradi-
tions of the past; the most offensive of the latter was 
the tendency to reason fallaciously caused by the in-
herent ambiguity of ordinary language. In Bacon's 
opinion, the true remedy for these maladies was induc-
tion, or the derivation and testing of general axioms 
vis-a-vis particular matters of fact. 1 6 The second 
step of the method involved a massive reclassification 
of knowledge in which history and poetry (those 
disciplines subject to the faculties of memory and 
imagination respectively) were subordinated to philoso-
phy, understood as the rational analysis and inter-
pretation of data. In this manner, Bacon not only 
eliminated theology and metaphysics from the study of 
nature, but he also extruded moral considerations from 
the scientific study of ethics and politics. Poetry 
and history are, ex hypothesi, irrational and, there-
fore, impractical. Questions of right conduct are 
relegated to the sphere of divine revelation. The 
study of ethical and political life is no longer imbued 
with the normative predilection of classical humanism, 
but takes on the less edifying task of causal explana-
tion aimed at learning "how to frame and subdue the 
will or men. 1 1 1 7 
The identification of philosophy with technological 
control and manipulation is the chief reason why the 
experimental method provides "reassurance" (the third 
step of Bacon's method). Bacon's reconstruction of the 
sciences, especially his repudiation of the conserva-
tive, backward-looking ideal of classical humanism, was 
intended to justify the advance of knowledge through 
the acquisition of ever more reliable techniques for 
mastering nature. Bacon's reduction of praxis to 
techne greatly influenced Thomas Hobbes, who was the 
first to realize its potential for political science.1* 
It was Hobbes, not Machiavelli, who consecrated the 
first major break with classical humanism by redefining 
natural law in terms of Galilean mechanics. Both 
Gadamer and Habermas take cognizance of this decisive 
turn; while repudiating the metaphysical aspirations of 
classical political philosophy, they nonetheless sym-
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pathize with the normative treatment, for example, of 
natural law as it is articulated by Aristotle and the 
Stoics. 
Descartes followed Bacon in detaching morality from 
theory and his endorsement of a mind/body dualism paved 
the way for a further articulation of scientific 
method. External nature, including the faculties of 
sense, memory, and imagination, which Descartes 
ascribed to the functions of the body, was conceived as 
res extensa operating under mechanical laws. Mind, 
which consisted of the sole faculty of reason (res 
cogitans) was imputed to possess free will. As a non-
material thinking substance it was not, as it was for 
Bacon, transferred to the province of revelation, but 
was made to function as the metaphysical criterion of 
knowledge as such. Knowledge was defined both as the 
acquisition of clear and distinct ideas possessing 
analytic certitude and the derivation therefrom of com-
pound truths.19 Despite the fact that Descartes' meta-
physics conflicted with the empiricism of Bacon, the 
mind/body dualism and the theory of ideas found wide 
acceptance among later British empiricists. Hume, who 
could discover nothing having legitimate claim to imme-
diate experience save the "given" impressions of sense, 
used the theory of ideas to extend skepticism to in-
clude physics as well as morality. 
At the beginning of the eighteenth century the pre-
sumption that Newtonian physics offered privileged in-
sight regarding the laws of terrestrial and celestial 
dynamics posed a further challenge to the authority of 
traditional learning. Besides disenchanted clerics, 
who resisted the new science on orthodox grounds, 
philosophers such as Giambattista Vico and the Third 
Earl of Shaftesbury combatted the hegemony of science 
for reasons chiefly pertaining to the unique claim to 
moral truth advanced by the humanities. The rallying 
point for both philosophers—one which figured deci-
sively in the Scottish school of Hutcheson, Hume, and 
Reid—was the notion of common sense dating back to the 
natural law doctrines of the Stoics.20 Vico's opposi-
tion to the denigration of the ars topica and the ars 
poetica by anti-traditonalist Enlightenment thinkers 
merits singular treatment. The vitriolic attacks on 
language and tradition provided a catalyst for Vico's 
own original defense of the humanities which ushered in 
a new phase of la querrelle des anciena et des 
modernes. Although Vico was a teacher of rhetoric and 
was thoroughly steeped in the classical tradition, his 
own originality lay in elucidating the importance of 
historical understanding for achieving true self-
knowledge. This substantial departure from Renaissance 
neo-classicism had a profound impact on later Romantic 
humanists. 
Vico began his career as a Cartesian but later 
rejected the superiority of the geometric and analytic 
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methods on the grounds that they were of no use in 
practical life. The foundation of moral character, 
with its attendant emphasis on adapting conduct and 
speech to the changing circumstances of the moment (a 
view that harks back to Aristotle's phroriesis) relies 
upon those faculties of common sense, imagination, and 
memory which Bacon and Descartes had expelled from the 
realm of reason and located in the "passions." Vico 
did not dispute this placement so much as capitalize on 
it by arguing that the natural primacy of sensus commu-
nis conferred upon it in virtue of its embeddedness in 
the shared habits of traditional life enable it to 
quite literally found community and right conduct 
generally. Because a sense that appeals to the pas-
sions which compel men to act fosters at most a proba-
ble, nonapodeictio certum, it essentially issues in a 
multivalent truth reflecting contrary positions.*1 
Vico takes this argument yet further by noting that 
even applied mathematics in physics and medicine pos-
sesses only probable truth. This observation is 
closely connected to his refutation of the Cartesian 
claim that apodicticity (clearness and distinctness) 
functions as a reliable criterion of knowledge, under-
stood as the correspondence of idea and external 
nature. According to Vico, mathematics is known with 
certitude only because it is based upon conventions 
created by the imagination, not because it conforms to 
the inner reality of nature.** 
The above animadversions contained in Vice's De 
Nostri Temporis Studiorum Ratione (1709) do not yet 
elevate historical understanding to the premier rank 
accorded it by the Scienza Nuova (1725), but they 
nontheless presage Vico's radical thesis that only what 
is created is truly knowable (verum et factum 
convertuntur). In Vico's judgment truth and making 
are convertible because ultimate knowledge of the rea-
sons and purposes for some thing or event, i.e., its 
genetic understanding per caussas, can only be had when 
the thing or event in question is of our own making. 
History, including the evolution of languages, myths, 
and socio-political institutions, is the creation of 
man and can be known from within as modificazione of 
individual and collective mind, i.e., as expressions of 
need, desire, and purpose. Because external nature 
retains an opacity that is impervious to genetic 
understanding—only the divine creator can penetrate 
its inner secret—mankind can but externally observe 
its operation and attempt to recapitulate its uniformi-
ties by interpreting them in accordance with its own 
mathematical constructs.21 
By extolling historical understanding (the capacity 
of the imagination to enter into its own creations) 
over intuitive reason, Vico set the trend for later 
developments in nineteenth century Romanticism. Vico's 
critique of those attempts by natural law jurists such 
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as Grotius, Seiden, and Pufendorf to derive the prin-
ciples of right from fixed, unchanging human nature, 
hi8 contray view of human nature as a process, condi-
tioned by culture and socio-political institutions, of 
coming to birth (nascimento). and his conception of 
hunian history as a progressive realization of self-
consciousness, strongly resonates in the tradition of 
Hegel and Marx.2* Nonetheless, his impact on later 
defenders of historical science, especially German 
historicists in the late nineteenth century, appears to 
be marginal. 
The humanist tradition that informs Vico's philoso-
phy of history and which continued to influence later 
German Idealism is first and foremost an ethical one. 
The guiding interests are twofold, namely the cultiva-
tion of moral character through the appropriation of 
common traditions and its nurturance in understanding 
the exemplary ideals of times past. This pedagogical 
model reached its zenith in Hegel* s concept of Bildung 
which, in the context of the Phänomeno1ogi e des 
Geistes (1807), denoted the process of historical re-
flection whereby egoistic particularity is elevated to 
the plane of free, universal self-consciousness 
(Geist). 
It was Nietzsche who disabused German historiogra-
phy of the pretensions of the Weltgeist, thereby con-
tributing to the emasculation of historical humanism at 
the dawn of the twentieth century. More important, he 
once again raised the question concerning the histo-
rian's proper attitude toward the past. Vico did not 
explicitly address the problem of historical under-
standing and he seems to have credited human fantasia 
with an immense capacity to imaginatively reconstruct 
the mente of bygone epochs. Indeed, it was not until 
the nineteenth century that philologists such as Äst, 
Wolf, and Schleiermacher began to write hermeneutic 
treatises dealing with this issue, which has since come 
to dominate debates over the role of scientific method 
with respect to the humanities. Apropos of the new 
direction taken by the controversy, it is particularly 
noteworthy that Vico's own rudimentary differentiation 
of two kinds of scientific knowledge, roughly cor-
responding to the modern distinction between under-
standing and causal explanation, anticipated the bifur-
cation of Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften 
that figured so decisively in the German intellectual 
milieu at the turn of the century. 
Ill 
Vico redefined the conflict between two cultures in 
a way that proved to be prescient in light of neo-
Kantian debates at the turn of the century; not only 
did he explicitly raise questions about historical un-
derstanding and its relationship to practical knowl-
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edge, but he also formulated this issue in terms of a 
methodologica1 antinomy. 
The concerns that animate the controversy at the 
outset of the twentieth century are, indeed, princi-
pally methodological in nature and stem in large part 
from the emergence of the social sciences. Shortly af-
ter the publication of the widely influential Schiel 
translation of J. S. Mill's Logic (1863), German philo-
sophers such as Helmholtz and Dilthey questioned the 
Englishman's thesis that the Geisteswissenschaften, no 
less than the Maturwissenschaften, had as their major 
aim the inductive formulation of behavioral and psy-
chological laws for purposes of prediction.** Their 
doubts about methodological homogeneity in the sciences 
led them and their successors to inquire more deeply 
into the foundations of the human sciences. Are these 
sciences nomothetic or idiographic, descriptive or 
evaluative, explanatory or interpretative? If they 
rely upon historical interpretation, then how are they 
scientific in a way that ordinary understanding is not? 
The Schmoller-Menger Methodenstreit in economics in 
the 1870's and 1880's, the intense discussion among re-
presentatives of the Southwest German neo-Kantian 
school of philosophy regarding the difference between 
Geschichte and Naturwi S3enschaft at the turn of the 
century, and the Werturteilstreit (1909-14) in soci-
ology involving Weber, Schmoller, Tönnies, et. al. are 
some of the more notable precedents which have shaped 
the German intellectual climate of the contemporary 
age. These debates are of primary interest to us 
because they bring into relief profound differences in 
approach that serve to pinpoint the major thrust of 
Gadamer's and Habermas' respective philosophies. As we 
shall later see, an accurate appraisal of Gadamer and 
Habermas cannot ignore their attempts to penetrate 
beyond the narrow methodological concerns of their 
predecessors to more primary questions regarding the 
basic objectives and interests underlying the social 
sciences as well as the philosophical status of under-
standing as a condition of social life generally. It 
is this direction of inquiry which leads them to 
retrieve the practical dimension of earlier humanist 
thought. 
Each of the following debates can be read as 
sequential stages in the elaboration and radicalization 
of what initially began as a purely methodological 
dispute (the Methodenstreit) and became progressively 
more philosophical. In the Werturteilstreit the 
question concerning the relative weight and function of 
practical evaluation and understanding in the human 
sciences is explicitly addressed. 
As its appelation suggests, the Methodenstreit was 
essentially a methodological dispute over what counts, 
or ought to count, ab an adequate account of economic 
behavior. At the risk of oversimplifying somewhat, one 
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could say that whereas Karl Menger believed that an 
adequate explanation of economic behavior consisted in 
shov/ing that some specific event follows, or is an in-
stance of, observed regularities, i.e., general causal 
laws connecting types of behavior with recurring an-
tecedent conditions, Gustav Schmoller maintained that 
because the patterns of economic life are contingent 
upon the historical self-understanding of social 
agents, an adequate explanation of economic behavior is 
only achieved when the reasons, or motives, social 
agents have for behaving the way they do are 
understood. It should be noted that neither Schmoller 
nor Menger discounted the importance of understanding 
and explanation as heuristic devices for gathering data 
and formulating hypotheses.1' However, it was Max 
Weber who first tried to accomodate a synthesis of un-
derstanding and nomological explanation in his far-
reaching notion of explanatory-understanding—a syncre-
tism which has led to a great deal of confusion among 
his epigones. 
Weber also had to broach the problem of historical 
understanding bequeathed to him by Dilthey. Occasion-
ally, Weber suggests that Sinnverstehen involves at-
tributing a psychological motive to an agent on the 
basis of empathetic identification, introspection, and 
correlation of the interpreter's own psychological 
states with observed behavioral regularities.27 On 
this reading, understanding would not be the terminus 
ad quem of sociological explanation, but would at most 
function as a heuristic device for formulating empiri-
cally testable laws of behavior—a view that was later 
defended by T. Abel in his essay, "The Operation Called 
Verstehen" (1948). 2 2 Elsewhere, however, Weber subor-
dinates causal explanation to the overall goal of rend-
ering action intelligible. Moreover, he also notes 
that to the degree that behavior deviates from the 
ideal norm of purposive-rational (zweckrational) action 
and is motivated less by an objective calculation of 
ends and means than by value-laden considerations, the 
possibility of psychologically identifying with the 
agent and verifying the attribution of motives on the 
basis of observed behavior becomes increasingly 
remote.2' In the introduction to Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft Weber attempts to elide the problem of em-
pathy altogether by asserting that social action can 
reveal its meaning or rationale directly in the same 
way that mathematical equations do.1* Recently, this 
theory of understanding has enjoyed widespread popu-
larity among those philosophers of language, such as 
Alasdair Maclntyre and Peter Winch, who argue that 
Verstehen involves elaborating the logic of language 
games by showing how an action is an instance of fol-
lowing a publically accepted rule. 1 1 
The preceding discussion of interpretative metho-
dology is not gratuitous, for it raises the conceptual 
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and, hence, philosophical question regarding the very 
nature of understanding as such—a non-methodological 
issue which is integral to Habermas' and Gadamer's 
defense of a humanistic social science. Neither 
Schmoller nor Weber attempted to ground their defense 
of understanding conceived as a method of gaining ac-
cess to sociological data in a deeper philosophical re-
flection on the constitutive nature of understanding 
with respect to social life as such. By construing un-
derstanding as a psychological act of empathy, they ig-
nored its essentially linguistic, communicative 
structure. The methodological truncation of under-
standing is the reverse side of its subjectivization. 
Once understanding is redefined as communication and 
che latter is demonstrated to be constitutive of 
cultural reproduction, socialization, and social inte-
gration, then the decision in favor of a hermeneutic 
social science having practical intent becomes philo-
sophically compelling. 
The gradual orientation of the series of debates 
away from methodological to meta-theoretical concerns 
regarding the interpretative constitution of society 
was undertaken by the Southwest German School of 
Philosophy. Unlike their fellow neo-Kantians at 
Marburg, who mostly concentrated their efforts in ex-
amining the logical foundations of natural science—for 
them the prototype of all knowledge—the Baden school, 
whose leading figures were Heinrich Rickert and Wilhelm 
Windelband, focused their attention on the historical 
and cultural sciences. Beginning with Windelband's 
famous rectoral address of 1894, the school attempted 
to redefine the distinction between the natural and 
cultural sciences without invoking any metaphysical du-
alisms between nature and spirit.11 In so doing, they 
were primarily responding to Dilthey's pioneering 
strategy of philosophically founding the distinction 
between the so-called Geisteswissenschaften and Natur-
wissenschaften on a dichotomy between the realms of 
mental life and external nature. Dilthey maintained 
that mental phenomena exhibit a narrative unity in 
which past, present, and future experiences interpene-
trate one another. For Dilthey, this model of inner 
life dictated the proper aim of the social sciences and 
humanities, namely the restoration of past spiritual 
life to contemporary consciousness. Like Vico and 
Schleiermacher before him, Dilthey believed that only 
spiritual objectifications were intelligible, or 
susceptible to empathetic identification {ginfühlen) 
and reproduction (Nacherleben).13 
Dilthey's tendency to lapse into a nature/spirit 
dualism and his apparent inability to account for the 
possibility of empirical psychology, conceived as a 
nomothetic discipline, led Windelband to discard the 
old distinction between Naturwissenschaft and Geistes-
wissenschaft in favor of a distinction between natural 
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science and history (Geschichte)• What distinguishes 
these two epistemological domains, he asserted, is not 
the subject matter of which they treat, but rather 
their fundamental cognitive goals. Natural science 
seeks to discover nomological uniformities for purposes 
of prediction and control. Historical science aims at 
understanding the meaning of individual events for pur-
poses of practical enlightenment.1* 
Rickert followed Windelband in framing methodologi-
cal issues within the context of logical inquiry. 
Moreover, he developed Windelband's distinction between 
nomothetic and idiographic science further. Windelband 
based this distinction on the logical difference 
between general and particular judgments; Rickert 
grounded it in a deeper ontological analysis of scien-
tific concept formation. He particularly emphasized 
the value-relatedness (Wertbeziehung) of culture, main-
taining that it alone was decisive for historical 
understanding. Whereas the natural sciences constitute 
their object field by means of generaliziang concepts, 
the cultural sciences do so by means of individuating 
concepts, or values. Rickert'a substitution of 
Kulturwissenschaften for Dilthey's Geisteswissenschaf-
ten indicates an attempt on his part to see the entire 
realm of culture as a transcendentally constituted 
field of normative objects that resist psychological 
reduction. However, because Rickert held fast to a 
psychological conception of understanding, he, like 
Dilthey, continued to think of understanding in terms 
of a factual, correspondence relation. This led him to 
eschew evaluation as a legitimate concern of the social 
sciences and to seek a non-relativistic, objective 
basis for historical inquiry in transhistorical cultur-
al values.3* 
Weber was enormously influenced by Rickert's 
hypothesis concerning the value-relatedness of cultural 
phenomena and its importance for concept formation in 
the social sciences. In the Werturteilstreit of 1909-
14 the question regarding the role of value judgments 
in social science was debated among members of the 
Verein für Sozialpolitik. Despite the fact that Weber 
acknowledged the transcendental role played by values 
in constituting social life, even going so far as to 
concede that the guiding interests and conceptual ap-
paratus of social inquiry are inextricably value-laden, 
he nonetheless continued to espouse the model of a wer-
turtei Ifrei social science on the bais of a neo-Kantian 
separation of knowledge and evaluation." As I noted 
abqve, this dulistic methodology directly emanates from 
a "divinatory" or "empathetic" conception of under-
standing that is charateristic of the school of 
Romantic hermeneutics from Schleiermacher to Dilthey.37 
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IV 
The series of debates outlined above form the com-
mon intellectual heritage of Gadamer and Habermas. As 
we have seen, the succession of controversies displays 
a continuous, progressive development culminating in a 
philosophical awareness that social life is "objec-
tively" constituted by values which can only be dis-
closed in understanding. However, with the exception 
of some of Weber's and Dilthey's last reflections on 
the nature of Verstehen, one discerns a general ten-
dency among neo-Kantian thinkers to psychologize under-
standing, thereby neglecting its essentially critical 
and evaluative nature. The net result of this line of 
thought is a kind of positivism which annexes all 
knowledge and science to the purely descriptive para-
digm of the exact sciences. 
The following section is concerned with examining 
several disputes in which Gadamer and Habermas explic-
itly confronted their neo-Kantian past. These debates 
are of signal importance to us because they serve to 
stress the basic commonality underlying Gadamer's and 
Habermas' respective positions, namely, a rejection of 
a subject!vistic conception of understanding in favor 
of a communicative model and an affirmation of the 
deeply moral and evaluative character of the human 
sciences. They also provide a transitional stage to 
the final philosophical section of the historical 
analysis. First, as quasi-methodological disputes they 
demonstrate in the most profound way the limits of the 
exclusively methodological focus of the neo-Kantian 
tradition which prevent it from resolving some of its 
fundamental aporlai. Second, insofar as these debates 
issue in a dialectical conception of understanding 
which encompasses cognition and moral reflection in a 
unitary Bildungsprozess, they already anticipate a 
Hegelian perspective. 
The Betti-Cadamer Debate. The Betti-Gadamer contro-
versy in the I960's illustrates the degree to which 
Gadamer's hermeneutics deviates from the methodological 
and theoretical treatment of understanding so typical 
of neo-Kantian philosophy. Contrary to what one might 
be led to believe judging from their own remarks, 
Emilio Betti and Gadamer did not fundamentally disagree 
about any particular methodological or theoretical 
point. What they contested was rather the basic philo-
sophical mise en scene in which questions regarding 
the status of understanding in the human sciences were 
to be cast. Betti has made it clear that the Kantian 
task of settling the epistemological issue regarding 
the quaestio iuris of objective knowledge and truth ap-
plies foremost to the problem of understanding in the 
human sciences." Subsequently, he sees this task as 
continuing the tradition of Romantic hermeneutics ex-
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tending from Schleiermacher to Dilthey, the principal 
aims of which were the articulation of criteria, in-
cluding methods of procedure, and the classification of 
types. For Betti, as for Dilthey and Weber, the possi-
bility of objective understanding rests upon the capa-
city of the interpreter to reconstruct the intentions 
of the author or agent. Thus, while allowing that 
evaluation and practical application may be appropriate 
in jurisprudence and theology, Betti remains pre-
eminently a defender of a wertfrei science of 
interpretation. Gadamer, in contrast, departs from the 
Heideggerian assumption that understanding and inter-
pretation are ontologically constitutive of human ex-
istence (Dasein). Though he too maintains that the 
proper goal of hermeneutic theory is the justification 
of objective understanding and truth, he situates this 
project within the ambit of human historicity 
(Geschichtlichkeit) and the practical concerns gener-
ated within it. These concerns are inextricably bound 
to the formation of moral identity through participa-
tion in tradition. Hence, the notions of objective 
knowledge and truth which Gadamer seeks to vindicate 
have less to do with the attainment of correct, or 
valid interpretation, than they do with the transmis-
sion of culture. Given the ontological priorities of 
Gadamer's enterprise, which proceed from the indispen-
sable role that traditional prejudices (Vorurteile) 
play in any disclosure of meaning, it is quite logical 
that he stress the eventfulness of understanding as a 
process which prescinds from methodological control. 
Similarly, his recovery of the rhetorical humanism of 
Isocrates and Vico must be understood in light of his 
conviction that the sensus communis which underlies all 
community and interpretation is the necessary outcome 
of an artful play of forces (or probable arguments) 
rather than of any demonstrative grounding. 
Betti*s hermeneutics is chiefly inspired by 
Dilthey's attempt to provide transcendental foundations 
for the Geisteswissenschaften. Betti maintains that 
the possibility of scientific understanding is con-
tingent upon the objective ideality of values which are 
expressed in mental life. Values possess an absolute 
lawfulness which transcends personal caprice as well as 
the vicissitudes of time and place. Such values can 
only be known insofar as they are objectified by par-
ticular individuals in linguistic symbols and dateable 
artifacts. Here Betti recurs to Wilhelm von Humboldt's 
theory of language and finds that his distinction 
between Sprache (language) and Rede (discourse), which 
prefigures Saussure's structural linguistic dichotomy 
°f langue and parole, captures the relationship between 
ideal noetic content and material expression. Under-
standing is always more than mere knowledge of the im-
mediate signification of words used in speaking and 
writing; it also presupposes interpretative participa-
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tion in an ideal system of possible linguistic, aes-
thetic, emotive, and ethical values. It is only 
because signs are the material embodiment of intentions 
which are themselves instantiations of a transpersonal 
realm of values that meaning can be communicated." 
According to Betti, interpretation is the recon-
struction of the author's original intentions. 
Contrary to Dilthey, Betti insists that this is not a 
psychological act involving empathetic transposition 
into the mind of the other so much as it is a logical 
process of discerning, as Collingwood and others would 
have it, a probable rationale. Once the author's orig-
inal intentions are known, Verstehen is achieved.*'1 
Among the more important metatheoretical conditions 
for the possibility of correct understanding mentioned 
by Betti are self-effacement and receptivity on the 
part of the interpreter. These capacities are them-
selves conditioned by a triadic dialectic of interpre-
tation. At the two extremes of the dialectic are the 
mind of the author, which demands recognition as au-
tonomous (an sich) and original, and the mind of the 
interpreter, which requires actuality (Actualität), or 
the integration of meaning with respect to chosen 
theoretical interests and familiar cultural background. 
This antinomial relationship is mediated by the object 
of interpretation.*1 Clearly, the demand for actuality 
on the part of the interpreter limits the extent to 
which his subjectivity can be effaced. Nonetheless, 
Betti warns against misconstruing this condition as an 
obstacle to attaining objectivity. With Weber, he ar-
gues that the Wertbeziehung of the hermeneutic situa-
tion need not nor should not interfere with the wert-
frei conduct of interpretation. The interpreter cannot 
but be selective in the kinds of interests and cultural 
orientations which he brings to the subject matter. 
But this does not entitle him to impose his own point 
of view on it (what Betti calls Deutung as distinct 
from true interpretation, or Auslegung), nor does it 
condone appropriating its meaning for the sake of prac-
tical edification or self-confirmation--an abuse which 
Betti believes is especially prevalent among 
Heideggerian hermeneuts such as Bultmann and Gadamer, 
whose "existentialist" leanings putatively lead them to 
subordinate considerations of ojectivity to subjective 
Schwärmerei and obfuscation.** 
Because of the actuality of interpretation, her-
meneutic objectivity, Betti admits, does not entail 
that all correct interpretations of a given text neces-
sarily coincide with one another. The historical 
diversity of We1tanschauungen insures that interpreta-
tion can never be complete or final.** However, 
because the congealed meaning embedded in the objectif-
ication exists independently of the interpreter, no two 
interpretations reflecting the same interest and 
cultural horizon can vary substantially without one of 
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them being false. Thus, hermeneutic objectivity im-
plies an absolute criterion of truth, albeit, one that 
is relative to historically variable perspectives. 
Once the interpreter selects a specific range of rnean-
ingfulness (e.g., the conscious as against the uncon-
scious motives of an agent, the antecedents and conse-
quences of whose actions are known by the interpreter 
with respect to his own limited historical horizon) the 
free-play of cultural assumptions theoretically remains 
marginal. 
Betti lists four methodological canons which help 
guarantee accurate interpretaion. These stress the au-
tonomy of the object, the supposition of semantic com-
pleteness and coherence in the object, the actuality of 
understanding, and the harmonization of understanding 
with regard to part and whole. In addition to these 
canons, Betti follows his predecessors in the Romantic 
tradition by breaking the process of interpretation 
down into four theoretical moments. These consist of a 
philological moment (the reconstruction of the gramma-
tical and logical coherence of spoken and written 
speech), a critical moment (the explanation of incon-
gruities and source analysis), a psychological moment 
(the reconstruction of the thought of the author as it 
reflects the spirit of his class, nation, etc.) and a 
technical-morphological moment (the interpretation of 
specific objectifications with reference to general 
categories, or laws of development, e.g., Problemsge-
schichte) . Finally, Betti devotes the greater part of 
his work discussing three types of interpretation 
(cognitive, reproductive, and normative) which differ 
depending upon the weight given to the autonomy of the 
text over against interpretative actuality. Only in 
the case of normative interpretation involving, e.g., 
judicial and theological application, is it a legiti-
mate aim of interpretation to frame the meaning of the 
objectification within the context of practical 
concerns.** 
Before proceeding to examine the specific charges 
which Betti levels against Gadamer, it might be useful 
to first look at the gravamen of Gadamer's critique of 
Betti. Gadamer does not cavil over the methodological 
substance of Betti's work; he himself strongly insists 
upon recognizing the autonomy of meaning as the aim of 
objective understanding.** The systematic classifica-
tion of types of interpretation he finds generally ac-
ceptable, but here he is unwilling to abide by Betti's 
segregation of recognitive, reconstructive, and norma-
tive interpretation. Moreover, he questions whether 
Betti's own account of the dialectic of interpretation 
is compatible with such a division.*" If interpreta-
tion is a "mean" between textual autonomy and inter-
pretative actuality, then any recognition of the origi-
nal intentions of the author would a fortiori be recon-
structive and normative, viz., it would necessarily en-
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large upon, or interpret, the meaning for purposes of 
communicating something of practical significance to the 
interpreter and his audience.47 
Gadamer believes that the preceding difficulty is 
symptomatic of a serious ambiguity which runs through-
out Betti's hermeneutics. Despite his repudiation of 
Dilthey*s assimilation of interpretation to Einfühlen 
and Nacherleben, Betti lapses into psychologism when he 
conceives the process of reconstructing the author's 
intended meaning as an act of interiorizing his crea-
tive thought. This neglects the important difference 
between understanding the significance of what the 
author intended to convey, e.g., some publically commu-
nicable message, and re-enacting his inner life. Only 
with respect to the former do considerations of objec-
tivity pertain.** 
In Gadamer's opinion, the fatal defect of Romantic 
hermeneutics is its uncritical adoption of the Carte-
sian subject/object dualism along with its attendant 
notion of truth, understood as adequatio intellectus et 
re. Even if understanding were directed toward re-
experiencing the psychic life of the other, the possi-
bility of transcending one's own hermetic orbit of men-
tal life and transposing oneself into alien spirituali-
ties would remain enigmatic. Not only would such an 
identification actually preclude objective verifica-
tion, but it would contradict the hermeneutic demand 
for actuality. 
Once understanding is correctly conceived as the 
recovery of a publically communicable message, then as 
Betti's own dialectic of interpretation suggests, the 
absolute bifurcation of interpreter and interpreted can 
no longer obtain. The message, which now functions as 
the standard of objectivity, is itself a Verschme1zung, 
or fusion, of "subjective" and "objective" horizons. 
True, or valid understanding is not the adequation of 
the mind of the interpreter is that of the author, but 
is rather an agreement (Verständigung) or commonality 
which is irreducible to the subjectivity of either.*" 
If true understanding is agreement, them inter-
pretation can only be a process of coming-to-agreement, 
or more precisely, dialogue. Far from demanding the 
self-effacement of the interpreter, dialogue rather in-
volves a mutual interplay of arguments and divergent 
claims with the aim of reaching substantive agreement 
over some issue which impinges upon the truth of the 
interlocutor's claim. Now because the claim of the 
other which confronts the interpreter is always the 
claim of tradition speaking through the text, it is 
fundamentally a claim that is addressed to his humanity 
and is, therefore, pre-eminently of practical concern 
to him, whether he acknowledges it or not. Conse-
quently, Gadamer submits that understanding is practi-
cal dialectic, or Bildung, viz., it is nothing less 
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than the reflective expansion of one's parochial horiz-
ons to encompass the point of view of the other.5* 
Gadamer, however, does not rest content with this 
formulation, for it leaves the cognitive status of un-
derstanding unclarified. The greater part of Gadamer's 
philosophical hermeneutic is intended to remedy this 
unclarity by justifying the humanistic belief in the 
epistemological credibility of the humanities and in-
terpretative social sciences as conveyors of practical 
truth. Toward achieving this end, he invokes Heideg-
ger's ontological conception of understanding. 
Presently, it suffices to note the outcome of this 
strategy. Simply stated, understanding for Heidegger 
ceases to be one among many epistemic attitudes, or 
postures one can adopt in experiencing the world. 
Instead, it assumes the stature of an Existent!ale, or 
£ priori structure of human existence. Qua Existen-
tiale understanding is the interface between conscious-
ness and world. As such it is an event (Geschehen) 
which is propelled by a play of forces extending beyond 
the control of the interpreter, the principal one's be-
ing his own prejudices, which prefigure a horizon of 
possible meaning. The latter, in turn, implicitly ref-
ers back to the practical concern (Sorge) of the 
interpreter. In effect, the self-referentiality of un-
derstanding renders Bstti's criterion of objectivity 
otiose. Because the personal situation of the inter-
preter is essentially implicated in the actuality of 
interpretation, there is no guarantee that two criti-
cally self-aware hermeneuts sharing the same general 
background, expertise, and point of view will concur in 
their interpretation of any given text.*1 Endorsing 
Vico's assessment of the rhetorical nature of practical 
knowledge, Gadamer contends that hermeneutic under-
standing, too, falls outside the purview of univocal 
truth and demonstrative certainty. elective under-
standing, such as it is for Gadamer, can only be the 
outcome of a dialogical play of claims representing in-
terpreter and text in which practical conviction rooted 
in passion and prejudice is ultimately decisive.*2 
The possibility of practical truth, and not just 
correct understanding, absorbs most of Gadamer's 
attention. The fulcrum of his argument now shifts to a 
discussion of Heidegger's theory of historicity. The 
main thrust of his theory is that understanding is a 
process of cultural transmission in which interpreter 
and text are co-constitutive. The underlying unity of 
tradition, of subject and object, of past and present, 
etc., generates an over-arching continuity whereby the 
claims of tradition are preserved and their validity 
extended. Once more, Gadamer appeals to the classical 
humanist tradition, in particular, Aristotle's concept 
of phrone'sis, in defending the idea of a universal 
truth which dynamically incorporates a particularized 
content.* * 
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Betti's rejoinder to Gadamer'a philosophical her-
meneutic predictably attacks its refusal to come to 
terms with the epistemological problematic concerning 
the possibility of objective interpretation. Betti 
protests that the autonomy of textual meaning is vi-
olated once the interpreter's prejudices and his prac-
tical situation are seen as transcendentally consti-
tutive of the text. Gadamer's attempts to salvage a 
"method11 for securing the "scientific" rigor of inter-
pretation perforce comes to grief.** This objection is 
even more incisively stated in E. D. Hirsch's critique 
of Gadamer. According to Hirsch, the "verbal meaning" 
intended by the author must be entirely separated from 
the "significance" it has for the interpreter—a view 
which eschews even the limited hermeneutic dealectic 
advanced by Betti. The implication of this extreme 
view is that the meaning of the text must be "self-
identical" and "unchanging" in "different acts of 
construing."** 
Gadamer believes that those prejudices which are 
productive for retrieving the author's intended meaning 
can be sorted out from those which impede and distort 
true understanding in a kind of dialogical encounter 
with past tradition. This encounter leads to a 
questioning of the interpreter's own prejudices as well 
as to a sifting out of anachronistic elements in the 
text. The process reaches completion when the meaning 
of the text exhibits inner coherence and agrees with 
the author. The Heideggerian extension of the her-
meneutic part/whole circle to embrace subject and ob-
ject requires that the meaning of the text appear rea-
sonable and truthful to the interpreter. In Betti's 
opinion, this amounts to conflating the canons of in-
terpretative coherence and actuality with accuracy; the 
prejudice structure of the interpreter, rather than the 
perspective of the author is held to be decisive for 
true understanding. Subsequently, Gadamer's progres-
sive reduction of interpretation to dialogue and self-
understanding forces him to collapse the distinction 
between philological, historical, and juridical/theo-
logical methods of interpretation.** 
The Positivismusstreit. The Positivismusstreit in the 
early I960's pitting Karl Popper, Hans Albert, Harald 
Pilot and other so-called neo-positivists against crit-
ical theorists including Jürgen Habermas, K-0. Apel, 
and Theodor Adorno, bears a stronger resemblance to the 
fin de siecle debates discussed earlier than does the 
Betti/Gadamer controversy, for it is concerned with the 
role and function of scientific method in the social 
sciences--an issue which, if at all, only emerges 
tangentially in the former debate. In the Betti/Gada-
mer controversy the question concerning, for example, 
the role of nomological explanation in the humanities 
is simply not raised. Second, both sides in the 
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Positivismusstreit appeal to the Kantian heritage in 
defending their respective positions, so that the 
debate always proceeds at the level of epistemology, 
never ontology. Prima facie, the Positivismusstreit 
appears to be a recrudescence of the Methodenstreit. 
That this is hot the case, however, becomes ap-
parent when we examine the context in which methodolog-
ical issues occur in the debate. The epithet 
Positivismusstreit is a misnomer, for both sides reject 
the old logical positivist doctrines concerning verifi-
cationism and the "given." Nonetheless, Karl Popper 
and his supporters share some assumptions with the ol-
der members of the Vienna School, namely, that all 
knowledge is (or ought to be) regimented by a unified 
method and that this method is defined by the 
hypothetical-deductive procedures of the exact 
sciences. This has led K-0. Apel to observe that the 
neo-positivists have restricted transcendental reflec-
tion to the methodological concerns of the logic of 
science or have abjured it altogether (Gadamer makes a 
similar observation with respect to Betti's 
hermeneutics).*7 Whereas critical theorists maintain 
that epistemological inquiries must incorporate a radi-
cal philosophical reflection on the basic social in-
terests which validate our different modes of cogni-
tion, the neo-positivist hypostatize the methodological 
aims and interests of science as absolute. 
One can glimpse something of Rickert's and Windel-
band' s transcendental approach to epistemological is-
sues resurfacing in the critical theorist's position, 
however much the latter reject the former's separation 
of facts and values. Conversely, Popper and Albert es-
sentially adopt a Weberian stance with respect to the 
role of values and value judgments in scientific 
research. To be sure, the neo-positivists do not deny 
the practical consequences of the social sciences. 
Indeed, they rather see these sciences as implementing 
social criticism and political rationality par excel-
lence. Still, the separation of knowledge and evalua-
tion forces them to construe practical rationality in 
the same narrow instrumental terms that Bacon and 
Hobbes did. The critical theorists, on the contrary, 
seek to rehabilitate classical political theory and its 
claim to offer ethical enlightenment. In pursuit of 
this end, however, it is not the rhetorical humanism of 
Isocrates and Vico to which they return, but rather the 
field of transcendental ethics that, with the exception 
of Scheler and Hartmann, had all but been abandoned by 
contemporary German philosophy. 
I shall limit my exposition of the Positivis-
musstreit to the contributions of its principal partic-
ipants, Karl Popper and Jürgen Habermas. In his cele-
brated essay. The Poverty of Historicism (1957) Popper 
promotes the idea of a technological social science 
geared towards engineering incremental changes in vir-
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tue of what he perceives to be the ineluctable selec-
tivity of empirical knowledge. Such a social science 
would abstain from making the kinds of holistic, 
teleological predictions which he accuses historicists 
of prescribing in favor of proffering conditional prog-
noses based upon observationally corroborated behavio-
ral laws. The chief advantage of the research strate-
gies of the exact sciences as Popper sees it is their 
production of a cumulative, systematic growth of 
knowledge which is capable of yielding technologically 
useful predictions.•1 
Popper repeatedly draws attention to the importance 
of the experimental method as the hallmark of rational-
ity. Although Popper defines truth as the correspond-
ence of laws and independently existing regularities, 
he nonetheless rejects the positivist doctrine of the 
"given," arguing that all observational statements, 
which for Popper predicate over material objects rather 
than sense-data, are "theory-laden" and, therefore, 
conventional. Popper also rejects verificationism on 
the grounds that, owing to the selectivity of experi-
mentation, one cannot absolutely confirm the truth of 
any hypothesis but can at most show that it approxi-
mates a high degree of verisimulitude. Thus, experi-
mentation is a critical process that tests those par-
ticular instances which potentially falsify a given 
hypothesis. The empirical content of a law, or its 
predictive usefulness, is directly proportional to its 
falsifiability, or the number of potentially falsifia-
ble instances which can be deduced from it.*' 
According to Popper, the scientific method is the 
rational articulation of a natural process of trisl-by-
error learning. Rationality is conferred upon this 
method in virtue of its objectivity, which Popper 
conceives to be a function of mutual criticism among 
members of a scientific community. The single most im-
portant precondition of objectivity is avoiding "the 
confusion of value spheres and (separating out) extra-
scientific evaluation from questions of truth."" 
Value judgments, though figuring in the choice of pro-
blems and the adoption of standards, are not rationally 
demonstrable; the commitment to scientific rationality 
is itself expelled to the beyond of pre-rational faith. 
Yet normative decisions are not entirely resistant to 
objective evaluation. Normative discourse must promote 
the free expression of competing opinions in which the 
force of the better argument prevails." Moreover, 
values can be evaluated both in terms of their overall 
consistency with one another and in terms of their 
consequences. Given preference scales, one can empiri-
cally calculate which values are optimal means, for 
realizing pre-given ends. 
The exclusion of value judgments is a fait accompli 
at the level of truth testing. Here, the replicability 
of experience as the impartial arbiter compels the in-
109 
dividual scientist to standardize observational data by 
reducing it to measurable quanta.'* 
Popper does not deny the importance of verstehende 
Soziologie for explaining the actions of individuals, 
though he sees its function as largely propadeutic to 
the overall aim of formulating general behavioral 
hypotheses. In defending the scientific integrity of 
understanding, he distinguishes subjective, or psy-
chological understanding from objective understanding, 
which he takes to be foundational for both psychology 
and social science. Like psychological interpretation, 
objective understanding explains intentional behavior 
by specifying a causal relationship between antecedent 
motives and consequent acts; it is not oriented toward 
the psyche of the agent, so much as it is aimed at 
rationally reconstructing the situational logic of his 
action. Understanding consists in "realizing that the 
action was appropriate to the situation"—a view which 
apparently depends upon the assumption that psychologi-
cal elements such as motives, desires, purposes, etc., 
are logically connected to certain kinds of observable 
situations.(> Popper further maintains that the social 
situation is structured by linguistic conventions, tra-
ditions, and other social institutions of which the 
sociologist must have some "participatory" understand-
ing. For this reason, he sharply criticizes the ideal 
of detached, impartial observation so typical of behav-
iorism, asserting that it harbours a false notion of 
scientific objectivity.'* 
Habermas' initial contribution to the controversy 
contains a mixed reaction to Popper's social theory. 
In the main-, he accepts the notion that the social 
sciences must proceed in a generalizing manner by es-
tablishing law-like dependencies. His objections, he 
tells us, are not aimed at research practices in the 
exact sciences nor at those in the behavioral social 
sciences. Indeed, he acknowledges that the latter can 
"be called upon as an auxiliary science for rational 
administration."" What he disputes is the so-called 
"unity of method" thesis that subordinates interpreta-
tive sociology to a mere ancillary status within the 
broader orbit of technological prediction and control. 
The danger of such a reduction resides in the de facto 
exclusion of value judgments from the province of 
scientific rationality. Habermas does not dispute the 
necessity of this exclusion within the methodological 
compass of the exact sciences." However, when this 
exclusion is rigorously maintained at the level of 
social application, the ultimate ends of scientific en-
gineering lose their rational mooring. There is the 
danger that a community of scientists isolated from ev-
eryday social life will choose their problems and solu-
tions on the basis of arbitrary, subjective decisions 
that have little to do with the real interests of 
society at large. Worse still, cynicism with respect 
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to the plurality of values may lead them to simply 
adopt pari passu the dominant point of view of the 
status quo, a concession which could conceivably lead 
to the perpetuation of the privileged interests of pow-
erful classes. {finally, the intentio obliqua of a 
purely behavioral social science, as Adorno astutely 
noted, would justify the supercession of popular demo-
cracy in favor of a technological administration com-
posed of managerial elites.81 These dangers do not 
abate when Verstehen is enlisted to secure the data 
base, for the underlying social institutions which 
determine the situational logic of action are taken for 
granted. Once the situational logic is understood, it 
yields predictions intended solely for use in manipu-
lating passive social nature. 
The major difficulty with the unity of method the-
sis, Habermas declares, is that it acknowledges only 
one kind of problem and one kind of rationality, 
namely, the technological task of discovering the opti-
mal means for realizing values whose validity remains, 
aside from consistency testing and utilitarian calcula-
tion, beyond the scope of rational critique. Here, 
Habermas reminds us that there are also social problems 
of a distinctly ethical nature that cannot be resolved 
through technological engineering. These problems 
revolve around identity crises which occur whenever 
widespread dissatisfaction with the social roles man-
dated by society arises. The ultimate source of anomie 
and alienation is the inability of society to live up 
to its ideal of the "good life." Traditions and social 
institutions "ideologically" legitimate relations of 
power and distibution which do not fulfill the promises 
and rewards implicit in their legitimation. This kind 
of contradiction is nor revealed by a mere superficial 
understanding of the situational logic of particular 
kinds of action. It also requires placing such action 
within the context of society taken as a whole, 
conceived as a teleological process. This deeper kind 
of understanding—what Habermas calls "ideology 
critique"--critically evaluates existing traditions and 
institutions which shape human character and action in 
light of their implicit ideals. Its modus operandi is 
ethical enlightenment through reflection rather than 
instrumental control achieved by experimentation. 
Ideology critique, then, is governed by an ideal of 
rational action which is distinctly ethical in nature. 
It refers to action which is both emancipated from the 
inner constraints of ideology and cognizant of univer-
sal interests which possess a culturally enduring 
"truth." Now the repudiation of wertfrei sociology has 
methodological implications which violate Popper's in-
terdiction against holistic, teleological explanation. 
Habermas notes that there is a basic asymmetry between 
natural laws and social regularities. Social regulari-
ties often assume the compulsory form of invariant 
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causal uniformities because of their habitual "ideolo-
gically frozen" character. This tendency is exacer-
bated in "bourgeois" society because of the "reifica-
tion"—to use Georg Lukacs' expression—of social 
relations, i.e., the fragmentation of social relations 
and the regulation of interaction in accordance with 
the impersonal and seemingly immutable laws of the 
market. However, unlike the static character of nat-
ural laws, ideologically frozen uniformities are norms 
"positod under threat of sanctions" whose validity is 
contingent upon the voluntary recognition of social 
agents.'9 When identity crises occur, this recognition 
is withheld and the fundamental organization of conduct 
is altered. In order to comprehend these changes, 
social laws must be construed as dynamic processes 
which ultimately feed into the overall ideological 
maintenance of society. 
Habermas' defense of a critical-hermeneutic social 
science ultimately rests upon a transcendental analysis 
of cognitive interests. Popper is taken to task for 
not pursuing his methodological inquiries far enough. 
Although he recognizes the theory-laden and, therefore, 
value-laden, nature of observation statements, he in-
sists upon defending a correspondence theory of truth 
which postulates an independent criterion of 
correctness. Instead of returning to pre-critical ep-
istemology, Popper, Habermas submits, should have more 
carefully explored the necessary conditions underlying 
the possibility of scientific truth in general. Here 
Habermas explicitly appeals to the Gadamerian notion of 
a "pie-understanding" which "anticipates" a horizon of 
possible meaning. According to Habermas, the meaning 
of the truth of empirical statements in the exact 
sciences is only made fully intelligible once it is 
situated within a broader pragmatic context. Scientif-
ic knowledge is valid in the most general sense because 
the norms and standards which govern scientific metho-
dology and determine the very constitution of observa-
tion statements are themselves valid. This validity, 
however, does not rest upon a profession of faith as 
Popper would have it, but is transcendentally grounded 
in a basic cognitive interest (erkenntnisleitende 
Interesse) in technical control. Such an interest has 
the force of a transcendental orientation insofar as 
the production and reproduction of social life neces-
sarily depends upon the domination of external 
nature.70 
The transcendental certification of the exact 
sciences limits their range of application to problems 
of a strictly technological nature. In his final 
rejoinder to Popper and Albert, Habermas argues that 
critical-hermeneutic social science also circumscribes 
a field of action that is transcendentally constitutive 
of social life, namely, that of communication. Com-
munication is the domain of activity in which ethical 
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problems and, therewith, problems of identity arise. 
Because Habermas maintains that these problems are ul-
timately resolved by critical reflection, he designates 
the operative cognitive interest of the critical-
hermeneutic social sciences "emancipatory." Habermas 
again reproaches Popper for neglecting to notice that 
the community of scientists and the discursive frame-
work within which they criticize one another—what 
Popper himself advances as the political ideal of an 
"open society"—presuppose ethical assumptions, includ-
ing the ideal of an unconstrained consensus achieved 
under domination-free conditions. From this point of 
departure, Habermas proceeds to argue that the sphere 
of communicative action is capable of founding a com-
prehensive rationality in which truth as such is rede-
fined as ideal consensus.71 
Thus, by pursuing the same direction of thought im-
plicit in Gadamer's rejoinder to Betti, Habermas' cri-
tique of Popper concludes by retrieving the primordial 
foundation of understanding in everyday communication. 
Seen from this vantage point, understanding is not so 
much a successful reconstruction of the intentions of 
authors and agents as it is an agreement, or consensus, 
about a shared meaning. In social life as in textual 
interpretation, this consensus is normative, viz., it 
is fundamentally a question of mutually recognizing the 
legitimacy, or truth, of those practical claims with 
which society and tradition confront us. What is at 
stake in both cases is the reflective cultivation, or 
Bildung, of individual and societal consciousness. So 
construed, interpretation becomes the vehicle by means 
of which consciousness emancipates itself from parochi-
al or ideological integuments and acquires a universal 
cosmopoliton perspective. 
In restrospect, the recovery of everyday communica-
tion as the guiding idea underlying hermeneutic inquiry 
marks a decisive turn away from the methodological ob-
session of twentieth century philosophy of science. It 
also coincides with a reassessment of classical human-
ist thought. Nevertheless, it is evident that Habermas 
does not approach the problem of justifying the practi-
cal validity of the human sciences from the same direc-
tion as Gadamer. For Gadamer, the problem is ontologi-
cal; it is a question not of what we ought to do, but 
of what happens to us over and above our doing. 7 2 
Philosophical hermeneutics can inform us about the 
nature of practical truth and how such truth is gener-
ated in cultural transmission, but it cannot proffer 
prescriptive enlightenment. Conversely, the emancipa-
tory interest of ideology critique cannot rest satis-
fied with describing, much less legitimating, the 
authority of tradition. The critical/prescriptive 
thrust of ideology critique demands recourse to tran-
scendental reference points. Ultimately, it substi-
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tutes the model of psychotherapeutic discourse with its 
methodological presuppositions for Socratic dialogue. 
The above reading of the controversy easily lends 
itself to a political interpretation that has gained 
v/ide currency among many commentators. On the one side 
stands the refractory conservativism of philosophical 
hermeneutics, whose major aim is the advancement of 
social solidarity founded upon continuing tradition. 
On the other side stands the intractable radicalism of 
Critical Theory, which ostensibly defends the 
Enlightenment credo of critical reason and individual 
autonomy. Whether this is an accurate assessment of 
the Gadamer-Habermas controversy is a moot question, 
yet there is undoubtedly some truth in the claim that 
the two philosophers approach the estimation of tradi-
tion from widely divergent Weltanschauungen.T> 
V 
We began our historical inquiry with the intent to 
illuminate the common ground uniting Gadamer and 
Habermas. It was established at the outset that they 
share an overriding concern to defend the moral and 
evaluative status of the human sciences, a fact which 
puts them squarely on this side of the ancients versus 
moderns quarrel. Next, we saw that they justify this 
position by repudiating neo-Kantianism and, more spe-
cifically, by appealing to deeper, philosophical con-
siderations pertaining to the communicative structure 
of understanding, itself conceived by them as the fun-
damental vehicle of individual and social Bildung. I 
shall now endeavor to show that for '30th Gadamer and 
Habermas this appeal is essentially mace with Hegel in 
mind. In particular, it seems to roe that their respec-
tive appropriations of Hegel converge at five points. 
First, both philosophers accept Hegel's critique of the 
subjectivistic and ahistorical nature of Kantian tran-
scendentalism; for Hegel, Geist (Spirit) is prior to 
subjective mind. Second, they retrieve Hegel's concept 
of experience, which denotes a reflective process of 
self-cultivation culminating in progressively higher 
stages of freedom and sociality. Third, both Gadamer 
and Habermas recur to key texts (the Logik and the Jena 
system respectively) in holding that Hegel's concept of 
experience is essentially linguistic and dialogical. 
Fourth, they retain the Hegelian ideal of an unlimited 
community of perfect reciprocity while, fifth, reject-
ing his conception of absolute knowledge and his at-
tempt to assimilate historical practice to philosophy. 
Despite these symmetries, it is nonetheless ap-
parent that Gadamer's Hegel is not Habermas'. Three 
differences especially stand out in this regard. While 
Gadamer emphasizes those elements of Hegel's notion of 
reflection that link the achievement of universality 
with growth into new cultural horizons and the preser-
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vation and extension of tradition, Habermas underscores 
those aspects that stress the opposite, emancipatory 
achievement of reflection whereby tradition is deprived 
of its dogmatic power over the individual. This diff-
erence of accent carries over into their respective 
conceptions of philosophy. Philosophical hermeneutics 
is essentially retrospective in orientation, viz., it 
reflects upon the historical substance that conditions 
our subjectivity as exemplary for moral practice. 
Critical Theory, in contrast, is prospective: its re-
flection on the past is shaded by the anticipation of 
an emancipated form of social life. Finally, Gadamer 
and Habermas appear to stand on opposite ends of the 
spectrum concerning Hegel's famous dictum that the real 
is what is rational and that the rational is what is 
real, the former interpreting it as an ontological 
claim about a reason already realized, the latter in-
terpreting it as a counterfactual claim about a reality 
that is not yet rational. 
I propose to begin my treatment of the Hegel-
Gadamer and Hegel-Habermas connections by briefly 
recalling the nineteenth century debate between "old" 
and "young" Hegelians which, I believe, directly ad-
dresses the last and perhaps the most crucial diff-
erence between the two philosophers. Following these 
prefatory remarks there will be a more detailed 
analysis of the relation between them and Hegel. 
Habermas, Hegel, and the Critical Tradition. Gadamer 
sees in Hege] s thought the seminal inspiration for all 
twentieth century critiques of the subjectivist eleva-
tion of abstract individual conscience above society 
and tradition. Habermas, on the contrary, interprets 
Hegel's masterpiece as the ne plus ultra of critical 
rationalism. That both thinkers should appropriate 
Hegel for what appear to be diametrically opposed pur-
poses is neither surprising nor unprecidented. The 
nineteenth century dispute over the relative priority 
of ontological over axiological interpretations of 
Hegel's system pitting the "old" (right) Hegelians 
against the "young" (left) Hegelians remarkably prefi-
gures much of the Gadamer-Habermas controversy. As 
Karl Löwith astutely notes, the schism of the Hegelian 
school was made possible by the ambiguity of Hegel's 
notion of Aufhebung, which connotes both preservation 
and negation, and his dictum that the rational is what 
is real and the real is what is rational.'* 
The old Hegelians, such as Karl Rosenkranz and 
Rudolf Haym, emphasized the moment of preservation in 
Aufhebung, which for them meant the restoration of 
Christian dogma in the Hegelian theodicy of Spirit. 
Religiously and politically speaking, Hegel's system 
was taken as a demonstration of the reconciliation of 
the individual with state and God. They maintained 
that because reality was rational--for Rosenkranz this 
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entailed that social and political institutions, such 
as international commerce, technology, and mass public-
ity, were succeeding in reducing the "particularity" of 
diverse nationalities and classes to the universality 
of a uniform civilization—ethical philosophy, under-
stood as the moralizing of would-be reformers, was 
presumptuous." Haym was less optimistic about the 
capacity of the Hegelian ediface to withstand the chal-
lenge of modernity. Nevertheless, he subscribed to the 
old Hegelian shibboleth that philosophy is essentially 
retrospective, viz., that in surveying the historical 
genesis of humanity, philosophy can only reveal truth 
ex post facto—as something which determines what we 
are but not what we ought to be." This view of philo-
sophy resonates in the denouement of Gadamer*s magnum 
opus as well: "In understanding we are drawn into an 
event of truth and arrive, as it were, too late if we 
want to know what we ought to believe."" 
The "young" Hegelians, consisting of radical theo-
logians, including David Strauss and Ludwig Feuerbach, 
and political reformers such as the Bauer brothers, 
Arnold Rüge, and Karl Marx, stressed the negative, or 
critical side of the Hegelian dialectic as well as the 
irrationality of phenomenal existence. The goal of 
philosophy as they conceived it was not the contempla-
tive appropriation of the past but the future realiza-
tion of its truth, namely the ideal reconciliation of 
individual and society which is metaphysically articu-
lated in the Hegelian corpus." 
Habermas' philosophy, and Critical Theory gen-
erally, take up the theory/practice problematic as it 
was developed by Marx and the left Hegelians. For the 
early Marx the concept of labor developed by Hegel in 
the Phänomenologie was the key to bridging the caesura 
between totalizing reason (Vernunft), whose telos is 
the overcoming of alienation and the reassertion of an 
overarching unity of Spirit and nature, individual and 
society, etc., and actual social life. According to 
Marx, Hegel's theory of labor grounds the historical 
cultivation of reason in the metabolic satisfaction of 
needs that arises whenever the laborer objectifies him-
self in nature. Through self-objectification the 
laborer acquires, as it were, a permanent, independent 
image of his spontaneous productivity and his affective 
needs states upon which he can then reflect and gain a 
sense of objective self-confirmation. Labor becomes 
for Marx the primary vehicle of critical self-
reflection; every labor-induced change in nature brings 
with it a new act of reflection and a corresponding 
discovery of new needs, or change in self-identity, 
which in turn necessitates a further act of labor. 
Labor not only reconciles man and nature but, insofar 
as it is social labor, it makes the satisfaction of 
other's needs a necessary condition for the satisfac-
tion of one's own. In essence, Marx transfers the pro-
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cess of rational Bildung from the ethereal plane of ab-
stract philosophical contemplation as it exists in 
Hegel's mature political philosophy to that of concrete 
practice. 
Habermas strongly objects to the assimilation of 
ethical Bildung to the category of labor, which in-
volves first and foremost the instrumental satisfaction 
of material needs. Because of this narrow epistemolog-
ical foundation, Marx, Habermas argues, occasionally 
equates social rationalization with the efficient tech-
nological organization of the means of production. 
Moreover, some of his later characterizations of 
historical materialism lend one the impression that 
changes in the forces of production, above all, tech-
nological innovations, "cause" changes in the social 
relations of production, which in turn, "cause" changes 
in the political and cultural superstructure. To coun-
ter this onesided instrumental!sm, Habermas returns to 
Hegel, this time, however, focusing on the latter's 
early theological writings and on his Jena philosophy 
of mind." 
In the Jena manuscripts Hegel interprets Spirit 
(Geist) as the intersection of three irreducible media: 
family, language and labor, each of which is a consti-
tutive component of human life. Language, the medium 
of symbolic representation, is the chief mechanism of 
social integration, since it is by means of communica-
tion that individuals come to share a common moral 
identity based upon reciprocal expectations. Labor, 
the medium of need gratification (but not the medium of 
need cultivation) only enables one to achieve a primi-
tive sense of self-certainty with respect to nature. 
Now the idea that linguistic communication is the 
fundamental medium of reaching a mutual understanding 
about common normative expectations reappears in the 
argument of Erkenntnis und Interesse (1968), where 
Habermas introduces it in conjunction with his criti-
cism of Marx's epistemology. As a critique of Kant's 
notion of a transcendental 'I', a subjectivity that os-
tensibly possesses a perfect identity and freedom prior 
to social interaction, Hegel's philosophy of mind can 
also be applied to Marx's equation of labor and self-
formation; the latter, Habermas observes, reflects 
Marx's Fichtean transposition of Kant's notion of tran-
scendental synthesis onto the instrumental activity of 
an embodied monad. Hegel's philosophy of mind sug-
gests, however, that communicative interaction and not 
instrumental labor is the primary vehicle of ethical 
cultivation. Consequently, the would-be critic of 
ideology must come to grasp the mechanism whereby col-
lective illusions are generated as itself a function of 
psychological repression caused by the violation of 
communicative reciprocity.,Q 
Once again, it is the early Hegel to whom Habermas 
recurs in rectifying Marx's onesided materialism. In 
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one of his early theological fragments Hegel wrote that 
the abrogation of a moral totality by the criminal 
leads to the suppression of the moral life binding him 
and his victim. This violation of reciprocity issues 
in a "causality of fate" which is experienced by the 
criminal as an overwhelming compulsion to atone for his 
guilt. In Habermas' opinion, the alienation of the 
criminal from his social identity exemplifies the pecu-
liar causality of fate that occurs whenever the reci-
procity between social classes is violated.*1 The 
ideological suppression of those emancipatory interests 
that would otherwise find linguistic expression invari-
ably produces identity crises, anomic social relations 
and, ultimately, political strife.** 
The "self-formation of the species," then, is not 
merely humanity's struggle to emancipate itself from 
the constraints of material reproduction as Marx main-
tained, but it is also a struggle to achieve mutual 
recognition under conditions of unconstrained communi-
cation. Habermas believes that at a certain stage in 
the social evolution of the human species, survival 
(culturally defined) can only be maintained when 
knowledge is elevated to the rank of science. Science, 
in turn, is a discursive, collective endeavor that 
requires freedom of thought. This relationship between 
science and reflection is given an incisive interpreta-
tion by Habermas. Citing the famous introduction to 
the first edition of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, 
Habermas argues that the interest in knowledge for its 
own sake converges with the practical interest in eman-
cipation, the middle term of the relationship being re-
flection (Fichte's intellectual intuition). For 
Fichte, the decision to achieve transcendental 
knowledge rests upon a prior, practical decision to 
free oneself from all dogmatic constraints and, in ef-
fect, become totally rational, i.e., perfectly self-
determining and self-transparent at one and the same 
time. Of course, the assumption that this act of re-
flection results in absolute knowledge, namely, the 
total fusion of self-knowledge (practical interest) and 
knowledge of reality (theoretical interest) is an 
aspect of Fichte's idealism which Habermas rejects. 
Habermas here sides with Marx's materialist critique of 
German idealism, a decision which leads him to assert 
that the emancipation from the internal constraints of 
dogmatic traditions and ideology can only take place 
within an intersubjective medium of the sort characte-
ristic of psychoanalytic depth-interpretation, which 
combines dialogue with a theoretically articulated, 
functionalistic explanation of symptoms.11 
In the remainder of this section I would like to 
illustrate the significance of Habermas' restoration of 
Hegel in light of some of the difficulties that plagued 
first generation critical theorists in their attempts 
to carry forth the Marxian tradition. Having descended 
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from the Marxist tradition, critical theorists were, a 
fortiori, self-prociaimed proponents of rationalism. 
Nevertheless, their understanding of Marx's ambivalent 
portrayal of bourgeois rationality, which was rein-
forced by their reading of Weber's unflattering 
analysis of social rationalization, led them to adopt a 
sceptical posture with respect to the prospects of 
founding Critical Theory. By accepting the neo-Kantian 
premisses of Weber's social theory and rejecting 
Hegel's dialectical philosophy, the leaders of the 
early Frankfurt School foreclosed any possibility of 
retrieving a notion of practical reason grounded in 
communicative understanding. 
From the moment of its inception in the early 
1920's, the founders of the Institute für Sozialfor-
schung conceived their task as the critical revision 
and application of Marxist theory to accomodate contem-
porary developments in captialist society. The major 
problems they addressed themselves to concerned the 
paradox of rationalization inherited from Weber's prob-
ing analysis of modernity and the inability of orthodox 
Marxism to become the theoretical weapon of the 
proletariat as it was intended to be. Now the 
theory/practice problem as Marx understood it bears 
upon the monumental project of devising an empirically 
valid (i.e., »scientific) social theory having practical 
import. For Marx, social theory is to enlighten those 
to whom it is addressed about their true interests and 
function in society so that they can begin to plan 
their historical destinies in a rational manner. 
Consonant with his Enlightenment outlook, Marx believed 
that the Naturwüchsigkeit, or nature-like development 
characteristic of the adventitious, spontaneous evolu-
tion of pre-bourgeois societies—a node of development 
embedded in the dark sediment of pteconscious tradi-
tions, including the parochial impediments to rational 
conduct typified by familial, regional, racial, and 
religious patterns of life—would be gradually eroded 
in the process of secularization initiated by the in-
dustrial revolution.*" The dissolution of tradition 
notwithstanding, Marx was aware that the acquisitive, 
self-serving behavior of competing entrepreneurs in an 
unregulated market—what utilitarian thinkers had 
earlier acclaimed to be rational conduct par excel-
lence—would necessarily produce fortuitous events at 
the macro-economic level, as evidenced by recurrent 
business cycles. Consequently, he believed that the 
only solution to the problem of rationality deficits in 
capitalist society was the revolutionary overthrow of 
class domination and the establishment of a socialist 
society spearheaded by an enlightened proletariat. 
Clearly, what Marx envisaged as rational conduct 
was not the enlightened egoism of Adam Smith, but 
rather presupposed the attainment of a superior vision 
of the pervasive sociality underlying the production 
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and reproduction of human life. The common thread 
uniting Marx's later notion of class consciousness and 
his earlier characterization of human nature as 
Gattungswesen (species-being) is the ideal of an eman-
cipated society in which mutual recognition is univer-
sally extended to all persons regardless of parochial 
ties.'* The major obstacles to achieving class con-
sciousness, in Marx's judgment, were ideology and com-
modity fetishism, both of which depict humanly created 
relations as if they were timeless and universal. 
Commodity fetishism is caused by the depersonalization 
of social relations brought about by monetarization 
(the reduction of labor to an exchange-value) thereby 
creating the illusion that social relations among per-
sons are natural processes among isolated things. 
Ideology, in contrast, involves the manipulation of the 
cultural superstructure, including the reshaping of 
traditions, for purposes of legitimating the interests 
of the ruling classes. Though Marx believed that labor 
organizations would engender authentic feelings of 
social solidarity, he was well aware that isolated en-
claves of proletarian militancy were particularly vul-
nerable to the divisive appeal of regional and cultural 
prejudices. Subsequently, he maintained that praxis 
unaided by a scientific critique of political economy 
is b l i n d . D a g Kapital is ideology critique in the 
dual sense that it exposes the lie of equal exchange in 
the production of surplus value and shows that the 
mechanism of capital accumulation is ultimately cont-
ingent on the "voluntary" participation of dispossessed 
producers. 
Later critical theorists, however, observed a ten-
sion between the theoretical foundations of Marx's 
sociology, which he appropriated to a large degree from 
the natural sciences, and his application of it, which 
displayed a remarkable sensitivity to the dialectical 
interdepeudencies subsisting between social conscious-
ness, politics, and economics. The clearest and, as 
Marx and Engels themselves later came to regret, the 
most one-sided formulation of the relationship between 
the cultural/political superstructure and the economic 
base is found in the famous preface to A Contribution 
to a Critique of Political Economy, where Marx states 
that "it is not the consciousness of men that deter-
mines their existence, but their social existence which 
determines their consciousness."•' 
One cannot underestimate the powerful influence 
that orthodox Marxism exerted on the members of the 
Frankfurt School. Nonetheless, their acceptance of 
Marxian tenets was not without reservation. The ortho-
dox theory, they argued, overlooked the tenacious hold 
that authoritarian patterns of thought continue to have 
on the individual in bourgeois society. Their discov-
ery of Freud in the 1930'a corroborated their suspicion 
that the extent to which such patterns are entrenched 
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in the most basic of all social units, the family, all 
but precluded an optimistic, economically based fore-
cast of the revolutionary potential of the proleta-
riat." The intransigency of ideology, conceived as a 
mass-cultural phenomenon embracing the very linguistic 
base of social consciousness as such, and the trans-
ference of legitimation functions from the economic 
sector to the political sphere in post-liberal capital-
ism, led them to subordinate the critique of political 
economy to Kulturkritik.98 
The School's understanding of the crisis afflicting 
contemporary bourgeois culture was principally shaped 
by the widely influential study of social rationaliza-
tion undertaken by Max Weber. Like Marx before him, 
Weber was keenly aware of the fragmentation and de-
humanization of modern society—maladies which he iden-
tified with loss of meaning and loss of freedom 
respectively. Though he admired the innovative poten-
tial of modern science and its methodological institu-
tionalization of progressive, cumulative learning 
processes, he also appreciated the considerable cost 
that a technocracization of society exacts from the 
human spirit. The ascetic, methodical lifestyle of 
businessmen, professionals, and bureaucrats demands re-
pression of self, one-sided vocational!sm, and rigid 
conformity to rules and procedures. The global admin-
sintration of life by the state and the subsumption of 
work under conditions of efficient production is viv-
idly captured in Weber's pathetic image of modern 
society as a steel cage. 9 1 The technocracization of 
everyday life is also a principal source of anomie. 
For Weber, the regulative idea of an enlightened commu-
nity of Kulturmenschen in which transcendence of 
parochial prejudice is combined with acceptance of 
pluralism is the reverse side of the relativistic de-
preciation of traditional values engendered by positiv-
ism and historicism. Cultural enlightenment is accom-
panied by a "new polytheism" revolving around a con-
sciousness of the fragmentation of value orientations 
and lifestyles, none of which any longer possesses 
validity. The nihilistic implications of a positiv-
istic repudiation of value-rationality are directly 
mirrored in the polarization of modern humanity into 
Fachmenschen ohne Geist and Genussmenschen ohne Herz 
(specialists without spirit, sensualists without 
heart), forms of life that exemplify the schizophrenic 
instability of a consciousness devoid of firm value 
commitments. Given this pessimistic appraisal of 
modernity, Weber could find no way to resolve the para-
dox of rationality other than by appealing to a revival 
of culture inspired by pre-rational charismatic 
authority.9a 
It was Lukäcs' Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein 
(1922) that provided the link, so crucial for later 
critical theorists, between Marx's analysis of commo-
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dity fetishism and Weber's analysis of rationalization. 
Lukacs' critique of reification was premissed on the 
assumption that the fragmentation and depersonalization 
of commodity fetishism and the objectification of 
analytic reason (Hegel's notion of Verstand) are two 
aspects of the same bourgeois "form of objectivity" (or 
mode of being and knowing). Opposing the neo-Kantian 
presuppositions of Marxist revisionism and volunteer-
ism, Lukacs sought to resolve the theory/practive pro-
blem in a manner that, in retrospect, appears to be 
strikingly reminiscent of the praxis philosophy 
espoused by.the young Marx in the as of yet unpublished 
Manuscripts. Returning to Hegel's speculative dialec-
tic of subject and object, Lukäcs argued that the cen-
tral position occupied by the proletariat at the dy-
namic point of production would enable it to penetrate 
through reified social relations thereby, in effect, 
becoming the identical subject-object of history.*" 
This return to Hegelian idealism, with its atten-
dant belief in a speculative identity of thought and 
being, was later rejected by critical theorists. 
Instead of pursuing the path of dialectical philosophy, 
however, they all but abandoned it in favor of a posi-
tion that by and large remained faithful to the old 
neo-Kantian dualism of "is" and "ought." Nevertheless, 
their dissatisfaction with this tradition of thought 
and their concern over the problem of practical and 
philosophical reason, led them to examine the relation-
ship between scientific method, philosophical reflec-
tion, and truth. During the 1930's the school conti-
nued to stress the importance of incorporating an em-
pirical study of political economy in their interpreta-
tions of cultural life. However, the contribution of 
scientific method in ideology critique was explicitly 
confined to the preliminary stage of collating data and 
formulating hypotheses; the interpretation and evalua-
tion of data was assigned to critical reflection. By 
and large, the School remained hostile to positivism, 
an opposition that was most clearly articulated in Max 
Horkheimer's manifesto, "Traditionelle und kritische 
Theorie" (1937). According to Horkheimer, traditonal 
theory, be it contemplative metaphysics or positivistic 
science, hypostatizes an absolute chasm between 
knowledge and evaluation, thereby ignoring the relativ-
ity of epistemological developments with respect to 
historically conditioned relations of social life. The 
methodological presuppositions .of the exact sciences, 
he noted, could be linked to the "advance of the 
bourgeois period," i.e., to the demand for technically 
exploitable knowledge in generating ever efficient 
forces of production.'* More important, Horkeimer 
believed that the demand to achieve ever efficient 
means of prediction and control was only one interest 
alongside another equally fundamental interest in eman-
cipation, the epistemic correlate of which was 
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reflection." By reflection Horkheimer meant not only 
the philosophical examination of the validity and range 
of particular branches of knowledge, and activity 
which, in the tradition of Kant and Fichte, disposes of 
epistemological dogmatism, or the view that the object 
of knowledge is "given" independently of the activity 
of the knowing subject, but also the critical exposure 
of cultural prejudices which legitimate class domina-
tion." 
Seeking to establish a legitimating warrant for 
critical reflection in social life as securely grounded 
as that possessed by technical knowledge, Horkeimer 
suggested a number of possible connections, none of 
which was convincingly defended. The emancipatory in-
terest underlying critical reflection is not, he in-
sisted, spun out of pure thought. "Insofar as mind 
seeks autonomy or man's control over his own life . . . 
it is able to recognize this same tendency as a force 
in history." Horkheimer also maintained that "the 
viewpoint which (Critical Theory) derives from histori-
cal analysis as the goals of human activity is immanent 
in human work."" Given Horkeimer's critique of in-
strumental rationality, this solution seems 
unsatisfactory. Elsewhere Horkheimer claimed that 
"this [emancipatory] desire has also found expression 
in cultural creations."" This solution, too, is rend-
ered problematic by Horkheimer's distrust of tradition. 
The difficulty is only slightly attenuated when 
Horkheimer says that a "certain concern is also 
required if these tendencies are to be perceived."100 
Rejecting Lukacs' "identity" thesis that che central 
position occupied by the proletariat in the process of 
production enables it to overcome the reified appear-
ance of social reality and achieve an awareness of its 
true interests, Horkheimer concluded that "the truth 
becomes evident in the person of the theoretician."101 
This solution seems to entangle Horkheimer in the very 
idealism which he sought to avoid in the first place. 
Despite the privileged role assigned to the criti-
cal theoretician in dispensing practical enlightenment, 
the founders of the Frankfurt School did not feel com-
pelled to justify their interpretations vis-a-vis a 
systematic ontology. With the exception of Marcuse's 
early flirtation with Heidegger's fundamental ontology, 
they adamently opposed "ahistorical" treatments of 
social life. 1 0 2 This attitude is especially evident in 
Adorno's critique of Kierkegaard's notion of repetition 
and simultaneity and Heidegger's doctrine of histori-
city. 
According to Adorno, Kierkegaard's existentialism 
"does not aim towards the determination of subjectiv-
ity, but of ontology."101 The paradoxical return to 
idealism and its identity of subject and object is 
markedly underscored by Kierkegaard's notion of histo-
ricity, which emphasizes the timelessness of the past 
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in the present. A similar criticism was levelled 
against Bergson's notion of duree by Horkheimer who 
charged that the circularity of temporality as the for-
mer conceived it absolutized the present.1'* Even 
prior to the composition of Negative Dialektik (1966), 
indeed, in some of his earliest writings, Adorno criti-
cized Heidegger's notion of historicity as a kind of 
"natural history" whose ontological roots were firmly 
embedded in the old identity philosophy of Hegel. In 
Adorno's opinion, Heidegger collapses the distinction 
between subject and object, history as experienced and 
real history, etc., thereby succumbing to 
positivism.109 
The denial of absolute truth created certain diffi-
culties for Critical Theory. As we have seen, 
Horkheimer was unclear about the legitimating warrant 
for ideology critique (unlike Karl Mannheim, he refused 
to go so far as to categorize Marxism as just another 
ideology). However, Adorno for one did not hesitate to 
suggest that Critical Theory's adherence to truth was 
not entirely consistent with its repudiation of on-
tology and epistemic absolutism. The inconsistency 
resides in the fact that the privileged status of those 
who offer enlightenment to those who have fallen under 
the sway of ideology needs to be justified.10' Now it 
is particularly noteworthy that Habermas' most recent 
examination of the history of social thought from Weber 
to Critical Theory emphatically demonstrates the inter-
nal connection between neo-Kantian Erkenntnistheorie 
and Bewusstseins-philosophie on the one side and a sub-
jectivization of practical reason on the other. In the 
wake of Critical Theory's failure to mitigate its own 
"contradiction," a failure which is directly attributa-
ble to its inability to break out of mainstream neo-
Kantian thought, Habermas' attempt to revive the 
Hegelian project of grounding the universal in the 
historical community of speakers carries with it a par-
ticularly convincing urgency.1'7 
Gadamer, Heidegger, and Hegel. I indicated earlier 
that the "old" Hegelian tradition provides a good per-
spective from which to view Gadamer's ontological 
hermeneutics. This tradition as it has come down to us 
is essentially theological and conservative. In the 
context of our present discussion, it is worth bearing 
in mind some of its major implications for the develop-
ment of Heidegger!an philosophy in general and Gada-
mer* s philosophical hermeneutics in particular. 
The tradition recurred to Hegel's Logik as the cen-
terpiece of his system and therefore took seriously his 
claim that history recapitulates the eternal logos of 
being. Seen in this light, the historical dialectic of 
Geist unfolding itself in time can only be understood 
as an identity-process involving the reflection of 
Geist into itself by way of its estrangement or objec-
124 
tification in concrete, historical life. The dialecti-
cal negation of an historical form of life is at one 
and the same time its preservation and elevation; or 
stated in Aristotelian terms, it is the becoming of 
what it essentially and already implicitly was. Again, 
for Hegel as well as for Aristotle, to say that the 
becoming of essence (Wesen) is its having been 
(Gewesen), is just to say that the identity of a sub-
stance is what remains the same throughout its appear-
ances. This notion of historical experience as a pro-
cess of emergent truth was, mutatis mutandis, taken up 
by Kierkegaard and passed down to Heidegger where it 
insinuated itself in his doctrine of historicity and 
repetition. 
To a certain extent, the conception of truth 
outlined above plays a much more decisive role in 
Gadamer's philosophy than it does in Heidegger's. To 
understand why this is so requires an extended examina-
tion of the latter*s theory of historicity and repeti-
tion as it developed out of a confrontation with dia-
lectical theology. It is my contention that Gadamer's 
return to Hegel is partially motivated by what he per-
ceived to be a residual trace of neo-Kantian histori-
cism in this theory. 
In one of his essays, Gadamer reminisces about the 
profound impact that Heidegger had upon Marburg theolo-
gy in the early 1920•s. , 0 , After hearing an address 
given by the dialectical theologian Edward Thurneyson, 
Heidegger, who was then an assistant professor at 
Marburg and Gadamer's mentor, remarked that the true 
task of theology was to seek the word that is able to 
call o' e to faith and preserve one in faith. In those 
days, neo-Kantianism was still very much in vogue at 
Marburg. Yet Heidegger's statement seemed to capture 
the sentiments cf a new generation of theologians who 
were beginning to question the methodological presuppo-
sitions of the older school. Above all, it expressed a 
yearning to return to the religious dimension of human 
experience, especially the awareness, so pervasive in 
Augustinian theology, that man cannot reach an under-
standing of himself by his own means. Given the occa-
sion which promoted the remark, it also seemed, in 
retrospect, to anticipate many of the dialectical 
themes concerning language, understanding, and tradi-
tion that would come to dominate Heidegger's thought in 
the years to come. 
In order to appreciate the theological strain in 
Heidegger's hermeneutic philosophy, one must return to 
the Romantic reaction against the Enlightenment inau-
gurated by German Idealism and carried forth into the 
twentieth century by Existentialism. Already Herder's 
critique of the Enlightenment's teleological view of 
history and his claim that each culture must be judged 
on its own terms challenged the power of ahistorical 
reason to achieve practical insight. Yet if we accept 
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Gadamer1s estimate of the counter-Enlightenment, it is 
Hegel's concept of Geist, rather than Herder's histori-
cism, which provided the impetus for the critique of 
abstract rationalism and subjectivism in the twentieth 
century.11" Hegel's opposition to "external 
reflection," or raisonnement, as presented in the 
Phänomenologie is primarily directed against Kant's 
"law-testing" ethics, which prescribes a method for 
evaluating customary maxims of action against a purely 
formal criterion of universalizability. Kant's ethics 
elevates private conscience, purged of all heteronomous 
elements, such as traditional prejudices and sensuous 
inclinations, above the historical substance of 
society. In Hegel's judgment, however, subjective re-
flection cannot proceed independently of values which 
devolve upon it from the public orders of state, 
family, and culture; for individual personality is it-
self shaped by publically recognized customs and tradi-
tions which precede it absolutely.111 
Hegel's concept of Geist has its theological roots 
in the Christian concept of pneuma, or the Holy Spirit, 
which unites everyone in the ego-transcending embrace 
of agape. The themes of redemption and salvation, so 
central to kerygmatic interpretations of the New 
Testament, likewise have their parallel in Hegel's 
concept of absolute knowledge, which transcends fini-
tude and alienation and culminates in self-certainty. 
S0ren Kierkegaard rejected the rationalism implicit 
in Hegel's system while retaining its dialectical 
structure. According to Kierkegaard, rational reflec-
tion is incapable of comprehending the irrecusable fin-
itude and uncertainty of human existence, a theme which 
was later developed in the twentieth century by Karl 
Jaspers in his analysis of the limits of objectifying 
science with respect to boundary situations pertaining 
e.g., to death and guilt. Kierkegaard argued that 
man's relation to the absolute was mediated solely by a 
leap of faith based upon inner conviction.118 This su-
preme estimation of "subjective truth" and decision was 
also mirrored in his criticism of the levelling tenden-
cies in modern society--an uncompromising portrayal of 
the public which later inspired Heidegger's discussion 
of inauthenticity in Sein und Zeit (1927).119 It may 
well be, as Gadamer says, that this particular in-
fluence, reflected in the latter'a "moralizing" ten-
dency to contrast the individualized decisiveness of 
authentic Dasein with the inauthentic "falleness" of 
one immersed in the anonymous conform!sm of the public, 
rather conceals Heidegger's real intention.11* There-
fore, we shall approach Kierkegaard's contribution to 
Heidegger's thought from the standpoint of his theory 
of repetition and simultaneity. 
The notions of repetition and simultaneity recall 
the kerygmatic, transformative power of the logos, or 
word, which Heidegger alluded to in his remark about 
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the call to faith. In Gadamer's opinion, Kierkegaard 
was the first dialectical theologian. He understood 
the "call to faith" as the permanence of an authorita-
tive claim which mediates the proclamation of the 
Gospel with the present. Simultaneity, Gadamer main-
tains, did not mean for Kierkegaard the annihilation of 
the believer's finitude and identification with the 
past, but rather indicated the "formulation of the 
believer's task of so totally combining one's own pre-
sence and the redeeming act of Christ, that the latter 
is expressed as something present (not as something in 
the past) and is taken seriously as such."11* 
It would be fair to say that the Christian notion 
°f parousia (absolute presence) that informs Kierke-
gaard7^ notion of simultaneity is also exemplary for 
Heidegger and Gadamer, who regard the act of under-
standing as the receptive appropriation of a message 
having ultimate authority for the interpreter and of 
vital significance to his moral identity.11* For 
Gadamer the authority of the message is confirmed in 
its ageless efficacy; we are already delivered over 
(Überliefert) to an event of understanding and truth 
which happens to us independently of our conscious 
volition. 
Kierkegaard's notion of repetition, which Heidegger 
later incorporated into his own theory of historicity, 
stresses the moment of preservation in 
understanding.117 As we have seen, Kierkegaard's 
notion of simultaneity articulates the element of 
preservation in kerygmatic interpretation, namely, the 
becoming-fully-present (parousia) of the Gospel in its 
historical presentation or proclamation. 
The theological motifs implicit in Hegel's and 
Kierkegaard's respective philosophies comprise an im-
portant part of the counter-Enlightenment legacy 
bequeathed to Heidegger and Gadamer. The Phenotneno-
logical Movement in Germany with which these philo-
sophers are associated also came to question the sub-
jectivistic presuppositions of neo-Kantianism. The 
theory of intentionality developed by Husserl chal-
lenged the subject-object, value-fact distinctions 
which underlie scientific naturalism. However, despite 
the fact that Husserl originally conceived his phenome-
nology as a "rigorous science" which, by "returning to 
the things themselves," i.e., the unexpurgated residue 
of pure experience, would combat the absolutist preten-
sions of natural science to uncritically dictate on-
tological commitments, it still operated within the 
subjectivist ambit of neo-Kantianism, attributing the 
constitution of the meaning of experienced objects to a 
transcendental ego. 1 1* However, in the last yeax-s of 
his life Husserl himself cam to question the possibil-
ity of completing the reduction, or methodological 
bracketing of prejudices—the definitive characteristic 
of "scientific" philosophy as he understood it. And in 
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the posthumous writings contained in Die Krisis der 
europäischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale 
Phänomenologie (1934-37) he all but abandoned the 
notion of a transcendental subjectivity cut off from 
the collective Lebenswelt, or pre-conscious horizon of 
intentionalities embedded in historical languages, tra-
ditions, and habits. 1" 
Heidegger's critique of subjectivism is closely in-
terwoven with hi8 radical redefinition of the problem 
of truth, which in the context of Sein und Zeit is 
treated as an ontological problem. According to 
Heidegger, beings are not originally encountered as 
isolable objects with substantive properties such as 
color, weight, extension, etc., but are rather dis-
closed as implements of use, what he calls ready-to-
hands (Zuhanden). The disclosure of praqmata, which 
includes such items as tools, equipment, construction 
materials, etc., is essentially teleological and prac-
tical in nature, viz., their meaning and identity are 
defined with reference to a totality of assignments and 
functions, all of which are referred back to the inten-
tional vector of the agent's aims." 0 
Heidegger elaborates the holistic nature of ex-
perience by designating understanding (Verstehen) as 
the primary structure of our insertion in the world. 
Understanding so conceived is neither a subjective 
faculty of sympathetic concern nor a specific epistemic 
method for deciphering symbolic objectifications, but 
rather denotes the way in which human beings inhabit a 
world (or stated differently, the way in which a world 
is opened up to us). For Heidegger, understanding is 
assigned the status of an ontological "clearing" 
whereby a world-horizon, or contextual background, is 
originally projected. The anticipatory, protensive 
orientation of projection (Entwerfen) is analogous to 
that foresight which guides our reading of a text. In 
the case of textual comprehension, the meaning of each 
sentence is syncategorematically determined by situat-
ing it within a not-yet-completed sequence of inter-
related actions and events which are tied together in a 
coherent totality by way of an anticipatory completion 
of the narrative. Similarly, from an ontological per-
spective specific involvements with persons and enti-
ties are thrown into relief against the anticipatory 
projection of a world-horizon. In both instances there 
exists a semantic interdependence of part and whole." 1 
The projection of a world-horizon is not to be con-
strued as an act of purely conscious, volitional 
discretion. The ontological status of understanding 
indicates a radical denial of Cartesian dualism and the 
false freedom which it imputes to human agency. 
Understanding "happens" as a moment of clarification 
which has already been elicited, prior to any act of 
conscious intent, as a response from the deep recesses 
of our cultural being to possibilities of meaning sug-
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gested by our present circumstances. P_§§ein is being-
in-the-world, viz., our ontological insertion in a pre-
understood world signifies a primordial community of 
human being and reality which resists reduction to 
either a realist or an idealist point of view. 
The significance of Heidegger's hermeneutic holism 
for the problem of truth can be grasped once we under-
stand the derivative nature of the proposition. In the 
pre-propositional circumspective concern (Umsicht) 
which typifies our sighting of tools, there is no com-
templative detachment separating "subject" from 
"object"; the implement is inconspicuous and merges 
with the manipulator. Though it is impossible to piece 
together the tool from an isolated subject and object, 
one can tracethe emergence of the "thing," or "present-
at-hand," in breakdowns and disruptions within the 
equipmental network. Once the tool loses its function-
ality, the unity of the referential Gestalt dissolves 
and we are left with a lifeless "object" which 
manifests itself as a potential subject of predicates. 
The origin of the thing, then, roughly coincides 
with the possibility of the proposition as that which 
explicitly predicates properties of an object. 1 2* Once 
the proposition is further removed from immediately in-
dicating something within our experiential horizon and 
is reified into a piece of information for purposes of 
transmission, it becomes possible to view it as a thing 
to be compared with an objective state of affairs. 
Hence, just as "thinghood" is revealed as a limited 
manner of projecting a scientific, theoretical world 
which is parasitic on an a priori matrix of practical 
involvements, so too, Heidegger argues that the cor-
respondence theory of truth is likewise possible only 
against the background of a more universal experience 
of truth conceived as "disclosedness" (aletheia)' 2 1 
Heidegger's analysis of truth as disclosedness is es-
sentially congruent with our commonsensical understand-
ing of the notion. Heidegger asserts that the truth of 
a proposition manifests itself when it is demonstrated 
to be true. Such demonstration has nothing to do with 
comparing proposition with object, but involves provid-
ing evidence in support of the proposition, e.g., by 
pointing out something or by proffering reasoned 
justification. The fact that the truth of a postposi-
tion is a function of its being warranted rather than 
of its being related in some mysterious way to brute 
sense data shows that a prior context of discourse 
determining the semantic domain of reference is already 
presupposed. The presentation of evidence in support 
of a proposition, for example, merely singles out those 
salient aspects of the data that have already been 
previously located by an agreed upon set of conven-
tional signifiers. In other words, ostensive reference 
presupposes that the referent already be semantically 
highlighted, named, and thereby ontologically deter-
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mined vis-a-vis the entire Linguistic totality of 
which the atomic signifiers are but a part. 1 2* 
I have noted above that for Heidegger understanding 
is itself ontologically embedded in a prior, culturally 
determined matrix of presuppositions which delimit the 
range of possible meaningfulness. This dimension of 
Heidegger's theory of understanding, which will occupy 
the remainder of my treatment of his hermeneutic 
theory, leads directly to a confrontation with the is-
sue of relativism. 
According to Heidegger, presuppositions operate 
below the threshold of conscious intent as a vis a 
tergo which comprises the familiar referential back-
ground guiding our search for possible meaning. This 
dependence upon a pre-reflective sedimentation of 
orientations, what Heidegger calls the facticity of 
human existence, signifies the state of being delivered 
over to a situation, a mood, a cultural identity 
etc. 1 2 8 Mow Heidegger believes that this dependency 
has ontological import for the way in which human being 
and world are codeterminative. Projected possibilities 
which do not facilitate understanding, or in some other 
way fail to mesh with the horizon of expectations, 
exert a counterthrust that alters this horizon, and 
therewith, our self-identity.12' The reciprocal rein-
terpretation of world and self (Auslegung) which tran-
spires as a result of this critical interplay is fur-
ther elaborated by Heidegger in his discussion of 
historicity. 
Heidegger's discussion of historicity is primarily 
concerned with explaining the continuity of Dasein in 
light of its dispersed, fragmented—literally self-
less--mode of inauthentic existence. The problem of 
self-understanding is clarified once we realize that 
what we are is determined by our choices, even if this 
means allowing others to define our conduct and 
expectations. Choice, however, does not arise ex 
nihilo. The linguistic forms and traditions that are 
inculcated in us map out a sort of destiny (Geschick) 
or predetermined sat of future possibilities in terms 
of which we understand ourselves and our world. Mot 
only is the being of individuals and their world rela-
tive to tradition, but this "ontological circle" is it-
self modulated through cultural transmission. A cul-
tural heritage is not a static accumulation of anach-
ronisms, but is a dynamic process whereby what is 
handed down and preserved is necessarily reinterpreted 
in light of the interests and concerns of the 
present. 1 2 7 
The past, then, conditions the range of possible 
understanding. Even authentic Dasein which has freed 
itself from public conformism and has taken responsi-
bility for its future must choose its possibilities 
from collective orientations shared by the community at 
large. Hence, the continuity of one's identity as an 
130 
event (Geschehen) of cultural transmission is always a 
Mitgeschehen, a shared event. 
In Sein und Zeit Heidegger maintains that every 
horizon of understanding is equiprimordially a linguis-
tically ramified discourse. In the post-Kehre writings 
culminating in Heidegger's famous Brief an der Humanis-
mus (1947), the ontological nexus increasingly shifts 
away from human decision to language viewed as the col-
lective repository of determinate concepts which first 
make possible the identification and descrimination of 
meaningful beings and events. Consonant with the 
theological undertone of this reversal, which assigns 
t o Dasein the passive role of spokesman for language, 
we now find Heidegger advocating, not resolute deci-
siveness and action, but receptivity (Gelassenheit) and 
openness (Offenheit) as indispensable conditions for 
harkening to the call of being.1** This respect for 
the authority of language as the "house of being" is 
combined with a kind of self-abnegating reverence that 
has much in common with the German mysticism of Meister 
Eckhart and Angelus Silesius.1*' 
The aforementioned account of truth clearly has 
relativistic implications. If disclosure is struc-
turally defined by an ontological circle in which every 
interpretation continually discloses new possibilities 
thereby transcending itself, then understanding and 
truth will necessarily be partial and incomplete. 
Consequently, there can be no final, absolute inter-
pretation of reality which escapes revision in view of 
the open horizon of future projects. 
Of course, it is undeniable that Heidegger took 
himself to be refuting the kind of nihilism and rela-
tivism that he thought was endemic to historicist 
historiography.1,8 The implications of Heidegger's 
analysis reveal an attempt on his part to salvage a 
notion of objectivity which draws upon the theological-
heritage discussed above. Citing with approval Count 
Yorck's criticism of Ranke as ein Grosses Okular, 
Heidegger argues that any attempt to reduce history to 
a pure description of facts is a perversion of its 
authentic being.1*1 Nietzsche's attack on German 
historiography is presented as an alternate model of 
historical research. According to Nietzsche, 
historians who seek to replicate the past without any 
regard whatsoever for the interests of the present only 
convey anachronisms that are meaningless to contem-
porary audiences. True history involves the appropria-
tion of past possibilities which critically rebound 
upon our complacent presumptions. The "monumental" and 
"critical" moments of history, however, must also be 
complemented by an "antequarian" interest in preserving 
the critical originality of the past against the 
levelling tendencies and distortions of contemporary 
consciousness.1,1 
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The kind of objectivity which is required in 
authentic historiography is elucidated by Heidegger in 
his discussion of repetition (Wiederholung). The 
repetition of the possibilities of the past involves a 
dialogue between the historian and tradition in which 
anachronistic elements in the latter and distorting 
prejudices in the former are subject to rejection 
(Widerruf) in a process of mutual questioning (Erwide-
rung ) . 1 1 1 Although Heidegger's account of authentic 
historiography is compatible with standard criteria of 
validity, such as narrative coherence and objectivity 
(i.e., loyalty to the author's intended meaning), it 
does not provide any decision procedures for adjudicat-
ing disagreements between equally compelling, equally 
coherent accounts of the same event. Clearly, the kind 
of "scientific" truth and objectivity which Heidegger 
intends to justify has little in common with what has 
customarily passed for truth and objectivity in the 
scientific community. 
It is in connection with the above problem that 
Gadamer's transposition of Hegel's dialectic of ex-
perience onto Heidegger's notion of historical under-
standing is best gauged. Following Hegel's preliminary 
analysis of experience in the Introduction to the 
Phänomenologie, Gadamer holds that truth and its ex-
perience must be regarded as two aspects of the same 
process. Seen from the angle of experience, historical 
understanding is a process of cultivation whereby ego-
istic individuality is elevated to the moral plane of 
free, universal self-conscious.tess. Continuing one's 
Bildung beyond the narrow purview of one's parochial 
understanding by familiarizing oneself with the lan-
guages, customs and literary accomplishments of other 
historical peoples enables one to achieve the freedom 
or openness necessary to acquire new experience."*' 
Gadamer's notion of effective historical conscious-
ness (Wi rkungsge schiebt1i ches Bewusstsein) denotes a 
level of understanding that has attained both breadth 
(universality) and depth (reflexive openness). Contra-
ry to Dilthey's notion of historical consciousness, the 
freedom from prejudice definitive of Gadamer's concep-
tion of hermeneutical consciousness is not actuated by 
eclipsing one's entire cultural background and restor-
ing it to the pristine state of a tabula rasa.1'* 
Rather, the emancipation from restrictive prejudices 
coincides with the acquisition of new cultural preju-
dices; for in Gadamer's opinion, understanding is only 
possible by translating the familiar into the 
unfamiliar. Not the transcendence of prejudice, but 
the disclosure of productive prejudices that open up 
new possibilities of inquiry is the goal of hermeneutic 
consciousness. 
Such consciousness is not an attitude that can be 
methodically or voluntarily effected, but is a state of 
being which one achieves pari passu in the course of 
132 
interpretation itself. Gadamer elaborates upon this 
process further by introducing two concepts, the fusion 
of horizons and dialogue, that recall to mind obvious 
Hegelian analogues. We have touched upon these notions 
earlier with respect to our discussion of the Betti-
Gadamer debate. It suffices to note that in contrast 
to Hegel's dialectic of experience, hermeneutic ex-
perience as Gadamer conceives it does not culminate in 
a complete identity of subject and object, but instead 
issues in progressively higher states of reflexive 
openness and universality. Significantly, Gadamer ar-
gues that openness and mutual recognition are necessary 
conditions of true dialogue, conditions which he 
defines by reverting to the normative phraseology of 
political rights: "The experience of the 'thou* also 
manifests the paradoxical element that something stand-
ing over against me asserts its own rights and requires 
absolute recognition and in that very process is 
understood."1" Elsewhere Gadamer acknowledges that 
hermeneutic consciousness articulates the regulative 
ideal of an unlimited, unconstrained consensus uniting 
all humanity. As a desideratum, however, the "ideal of 
a shared life under conditions of uncoercive communica-
tion is , , , just as binding as it is indefinite. Very 
different lifestyles can be harnassed to this formal 
framework.""7 The acknowledgement of a counterfactual 
hermeneutic ideal is a significant concession on 
Gadamer's part, and he frequently defers to it in his 
criticism of mass media manipulation, again a consid-
erable departure from some of his earlier views: 
Both rhetoric and the transmission of scientific 
knowledge are monological in form; both need the 
counterbalance of hermeneutical appropriation, 
which works in the form of dialogue. The chief 
task of philosophy is to justify this way of 
reason and defend practical and political reason 
against the domination of technology based upon 
science, . . . it vindicates again the noblest 
task of the citizen—decision-making according to 
one's responsibility. "• 
The influence of Hegel is also apparent in Gada-
mer' s theory of truth. Like Hegel, Gadamer conceives 
truth as a process of reflection, or re-presentation in 
which a universal content, e.g., the experience of 
human finitude that originally found expression in 
Greek tragedy, is preserved, extended, and further ar-
ticulated in historical interpretation. (Gadamer often 
uses such expressions as "ideality," "contemporaneity," 
"the classical," etc., to get at the historical nature 
of such "concrete universals"). Again,Gadamer's 
retrieval of artistic truth from the subjectivism and 
formalism of Kant's aesthetics shows that in art the 
very play-structure of experience itself finds exem-
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plary expression. Finally, Gadamer concurs with Hegel 
in holding that truth reveals itself ex po3t facto, 
from the vantage point of a retrospective comprehension 
of the totality of past interpretations. Temporal 
distance, far from being an obstacle to understanding, 
is rather the necessary precondition for critical 
dialogue. 1 , 9 
The other foundation of the hermeneutic experience 
is language itself. Gadamer*s conception of the 
"speculative" nature of language as a truly reflexive, 
infinite repository of meaning capable of expressing 
everything harks back to Hegel's notion of a specula-
tive proposition. For Hegel, speculative propositions 
that ascribe essential predicates to subject terms are 
synthetic a priori, and therefore simultaneously assert 
a relationship of identity and difference between two 
terms. Language also possesses a speculative nature 
insofar as its inherent reflexivity (which Gadamer il-
lustrates by referring to Plato's use of light as a 
metaphor for the beautiful) enables it to mediate the 
various antipodes of experience: universal and partic-
ular, is and ought, etc. In the final analysis, 
Gadamer attempts to circumvent the problem of histori-
cism by appropriating precisely that metaphysical tra-
dition coalescing around Hegel and Plato that Heidegger 
seeks to overcome. 
VI 
In summation, we noted at the outset of our 
historical analysis that Gadamer and Habermas share a 
common antipathy toward the neo-Kantian descrip-
tion/evaluation distinction along with its attendant 
positivistic annexation of the epistemological achieve-
ment of the human sciences to the methodological para-
digm of the exact sciences. The source of this bifur-
cation of experience, they believe, resides in the sub-
jectivistic reduction of understanding to psychological 
Nacherleben, symptomatic of which is the methodological 
truncation of the problem of understanding itself. In 
order to rectify this mistaken conception of under-
standing, Gadamer and Habermas undertake a deeper 
philosophical reflection which not only discloses the 
intersubjective, communicative structure of understand-
ing, but also reveals how communicative understanding, 
so construed, is itself transcendentally constitutive 
of society, making possible cultural reproduction (the 
transmission of language, knowledge, and culture 
generally), social integration (the securing of a 
normatively based social solidarity), and socialization 
(the formation of individual and social identity). 
Gadamer's theory of the prejudice structure of human 
understanding and Habermas1 theory of the interest 
structure underlying human knowledge both attest to the 
value-laden nature of all experience, whethei it be the 
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objectifying experience of the exact sciences or the 
participatory hermeneutic experience of the Geisteswis-
senschaften. 
The philosophical bias of Gadamer's and Habermas' 
"methodological" critique of neo-Kantianism can be 
traced back to their recovery of Hegel, especially his 
objections against Kantian subjectivism and his concep-
tion of the linguistic, dialectical nature of experi-
ence. In both cases, the return to Hegel enabled these 
philosophers to resolve fundamental conundrums within 
their respective philosophical traditions that derived 
from remnants of a declasse neo-Kantianism. 
Gadamer'8 appropriation of the conservative, theo-
logical and speculative tradition of. Hegelian thought 
is summed-up in the claim to universality which he 
makes on behalf of the hermeneutic phenomenon. The 
claim to universality of hermeneutic experience affirms 
the primacy of logos, or language, as the fundamental 
vehicle of truth and meaningful being. The paratactic 
juxtaposition of truth and method, as well as other 
philosophical antinomies, are resolved in the unitary 
solvent of language, conceived as a universal, unlim-
ited process of dialogue. The Sprachlichkeit, or lin-
guisticality, of human understanding entails that all 
ontological, axiological, and epistemological regions 
of experience, be they scientific, rhetorical, poeti-
cal, or instrumental, ultimately have their u.iirary 
ground in ordinary linguistic communication, which 
mediates the self-understanding of each and every ac-
tivity, including the application of all knowledge 
whatsoever. The speculative nature of this synthetic 
achievement also requires the affirmation of the diff-
erences within it, though like a true Hegelian Gadamer 
invariably returns to the "dialogue which wo are" as 
the alpha and omega of all truth; for him, every disa-
greement or difference presupposes a prior ground of 
agreement. 
The claim to hermeneutic universality has far-
reaching implications for Gadamer1s conception of 
philosophical reflection. In Wahrheit und Methode 
Gadamer identified philosophical reflection with 
historical understanding, the paradigms of which, he 
believes, are classical philology, jurisprudence, and 
theology. As he elsewhere states, the underlying in-
terest guiding the Geisteswissenschaften is essentially 
conservative: these disciplines serve to recollect and 
thereby preserve and extend the validity of a timeless 
truth.1*0 This deference to tradition as authority is 
another indication of the fact that reason for Gadamer 
is always "present" as a "becoming" that has "already 
been." 
Conversely, Habermas' retrieval of the young, and 
admittedly Kantian, Hegel prohibits him from assenting 
to the universality of the hermeneutic phenomenon; for 
him language acquires the status of being but one of 
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the fundamental media of experience (the moral-
practical), the other being labor (the cognitive-
instrumental). This distinction can be found, albeit 
confusedly, in Marx's distinction between relations and 
forces of production, the two variables of social 
evolution. In Erkenntnis und Interesse this dichotomy 
was further elaborated in terms of a distinction 
between communication and labor. Habermas' later ven-
ture reiterates the distinction once again as a diff-
erence between two planes of social life, the social 
1 ifeworld and the system of material reproduction. Now 
the limitation of the field of communicative under-
standing cannot but have methodological repercussions. 
Given the impact of systemic constraints on communica-
tion, the structure of rational dialogue must be 
regarded as an anticipated but nonetheless counterfac-
tual ideal. The postulation by Habermas and Wolfhart 
Pannenberg of an anticipated completion or perfection 
of understanding (Gadamer's Vorgriff auf Vollkommen-
heit) as the telos of a universal history not surpris-
ingly brought upon them recriminations from Gadamer 
himself to the effect that such an immediately practi-
cal application of his principle constituted a foreclo-
sure of hermeneutic experience a la Hegel. 1 1 , 1 In any 
case, Habermas denied that philosophy can model itself 
on the Geisteswissenschaften. Prior to his later 
distinction between rational reconstruction and social 
critique, Habermas held that philosophy had to become 
social theory in the direct sense of ideology critique, 
thereby incorporating a functionalistic explanatory 
moment in its understanding of the "latent," subliminal 
meaning of historical life. 
Despite the apparent irreconcilability of philo-
sophical hermeneutics and Critical Theory, it can be 
shown, and indeed has been repeatedly demonstrated, 
that notwithstanding obvious differences between them, 
the two positions are basically complementary. As I 
mentioned at the beginning of this essay, my intention 
has not been to canvass the entire territory covered by 
the debate but to indicate a possible rapprochement on 
the basis of their common Hegelian affiliations. It 
should be apparent by now why I chose the historical 
path that I did as the most perspicuous and advan-
tageous way of grasping this complementarity. Rüdiger 
Bubner remarked some time ago that one could understand 
Gadamer's and Habermas' antithetical positions in view 
of their articulation of different aspects of Hegel's 
concept of dialectic and reflection.1** When seen from 
this perspective the complementarity of their respec-
tive ontological and counterfactual conceptions of 
practical reason is also illuminated. For Hegel as for 
Gadamer and Habermas, every dialectical sublation is 
both a critique of an irrational form of consciousness, 
as well as its validating preservation. There is cer-
tainly ample testimony by the interlocutors themselves 
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to support this reading of the controversy and there-
fore I shall not belabor this point any further. 
Suffice it to say, Gadamer has emphatically stated that 
he does not oppose truth to method or ideology critique 
to hermeneutic preservation, and Habermas for his part 
has made it abundantly clear that scientific reflection 
cannot transcend the cultural linguistic lifeworld to 
which it belongs and that ideology critique is itself a 
re-appropriation of emancipatory possibilities inherent 
in tradition. 
In spite of the above reconciliation, the problem 
concerning precisely what the differences are' between 
these philosophers still persists. I believe the solu-
tion to this problem is to be found by elucidating the 
senses in which Gadamer and Habermas, despite the best 
of intentions, have not entirely eradicated neo-Kantian 
residues from their thinking. In the remainder of this 
essay I propose to defend the thesis that Gadamer's 
philosophical hermeneutics and Habermas' Critical 
Theory fall on different sides of the neo-Kantian dual-
ism of description and evaluation respectively. 
As Ricoeur astutely notes in a recent essay,1*1 
Gadamer has the appearance of being an unrepentant dog-
matist because he limits the epistemological concern 
vis-ä-vis the possibility of critical, "scientific" 
understanding to a prior ontological reflection on the 
universality of language. Insofar as Gadamer maintains 
that the possibility of every understanding presupposes 
a prior accord, he like Hegel reduces the critical 
moment of temporal distance to the status of a mere 
appearance. Without difference, however, there can be 
no understanding, a fact which he himself admits when, 
for example, he acknowledges in his own way tne 
importance—recently emphasized above all in the philo-
sophy of Derrida—of the distancing effect (differance) 
implicit in all writing and even in spoken discourse, 
to the extent that the latter also manifests a context-
transcending telos. And, as he and Habermas both em-
phasize, this critical difference becomes all the more 
decisive with the advent of historical consciousness 
and its relativization of tradition. Nevertheless, his 
insistence upon the ontological belongingness 
(Zuqehöriqkeit) of understanding to a unified totality 
(Hegel's identity thesis) leads him to neglect the role 
of explanatory methods in interpretation. Indeed, on 
his dialogical model of interpretation, which he ap-
pears to proffer as a methodological prescription as 
much as an ontological description, the only fundamen-
tal difference separating the critical interpretation 
of the skilled hermeneut from the naive, uncritical ap-
propriation of tradition by the untrained lay reader is 
experience. Moreover, the recollective orientation of 
hermeneutical reflection as Gadamer conceives it res-
tricts its scope to the modest task of phenomenological 
description: "My real concern," Gadamer intones, "was 
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and is philosophic: not what we do or what we ought to 
do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting 
and doing.11 In view of assertions such as this, it is 
no wonder that Habermas accuses Gadamer of harboring a 
positivistic neo-Kantian bias. 
In all fairness to Gadamer, however, it must be 
conceded that in spite of the proclaimed intent of 
philosophical hermeneutics his own program carries him 
far from ontological description to moral prescription. 
This is especially evident in his more recent social 
and political commentary in which he adverts to the 
notion of an unlimited community of unconstrained di-
alogue as a regulative ideal. 
Ironically, the latter ideal, which plays such a 
prominent role in both Gadamer's and Habermas' respec-
tive philosophies is interpreted by them in a peculiar, 
neo-Kantian fashion (though Gadamer, as we have seen, 
is hardly consistent on this matter). If Gadamer can 
be said to be guilty of a neo-Kantian taint of a posi-
tivistic nature, then Habermas can be accused of the 
same from the standpoint of his formalistic treatment 
of practical reason. The quasi-transcendental ground-
ing of practical reason in the ideal speech situation 
is purchased at the cost of depriving it of any sub-
stantive, prescriptive force. The net result is that 
particular, substantive interests and motives remain 
untouched (or undetermined as Hegel would say) and 
therefore are vulnerable to decisionistic treatment. 
I would like to follow up this last remark with one 
final comment about the convergence of Gadamer's and 
Habermas' respective philosophies. Since their debate, 
Habermas has been reluctant to continue advancing the 
ideal speech situation as a carte blanche warrent for 
criticizing every de facto consensus. Having apparen-
tly taken Gadamer^s objections to heart, especially 
those, which exposed the paradoxical if not self-
defeating status of his communicative ideal, Habermas 
has retreated from some of the stronger claims he for-
merly made about the critical scope of the ideal speech 
situation.1** In a recent anthology of critical essays 
devoted to his philosophy and also in his latest study, 
Habermas has been inclined to follow the advice of his 
colleague, August Wellmer, and regard the ideal speech 
situation as specifying purely formal rules of proce-
dural justice whose critical function is limited to ex-
amining the legitimacy of particular normative 
institutions. As, such, its use cannot be extended to 
include the evaluation of society as a whole.1** Even 
the claims formerly made on behalf of ideology critique 
are considerably toned down and the program concentrat-
ing on psychotherapeutic sociology seems to have 
receded into the background. What remains, curiously, 
is a social theory whose critical thrust is aimed 
almost exclusively at the instrumental "colonializa-
tion" of the lifeworld. The latter consists in the 
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progressive replacement of communication by strategic 
steering-media such as money and power which integrate 
action in accordance with the functional, adaptive im-
peratives of the economic and state administrative sub-
systems. Thus, the new criterion of social rationality 
revolves, surprisingly, around precisely the sort of 
valetudinarian considerations concerning the mainten-
ance of social equilibrium that has by and large domi-
nated Gadamer's thinking as well. 
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